The Potential for Violent Conflicts in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

An Assessment with Recommendations
for the USAID/Central Asia Regional Mission

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study responds to a request by the USAID Central Asia Regional Mission for an assessment of the potential for violent conflict in the Ferghana Valley (FV) areas of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, and in the Surkhondaryo Oblast in Southern Uzbekistan. In view of this assessment, it examines the problems and intervention strategies involved in the existing USAID programs in these areas. It concludes with recommendations about how USAID can adjust its programs and planning in order to address more effectively the identified sources of potential conflict and to strengthen existing capacities for peaceful management of conflict.

In the Uzbekistan FV, the potential is low for the outbreak of *widespread* violent conflict in the next few years, such as caused by Islamic extremists, inter-ethnic clashes, human rights abuses, or water and land problems. Sporadic local community-level violent conflicts are possible in the next few years, such as over water issues. Attempted incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into Uzbekistan by way of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are much less likely because of the IMU's possible decimation during the recent war in Afghanistan. If, however, the new government in Afghanistan cannot stop poppy cultivation, drug trafficking might continue through these countries and could finance new insurgencies. In the longer term, the most likely prospect of serious violent conflict in Uzbekistan is to be found at the level of political challenges to the current regime, especially to the extent the regime fails to bring about economic growth or to create political institutions that incorporate citizens and co-opt political ferment.

In areas of the FV Kyrgyzstan, violent conflicts at the village level and in urban areas appear to be somewhat more likely in the short term than in FV Uzbekistan. Occasional localized violence over water issues is expected, as in Uzbekistan, and more serious inter-ethnic violence on a larger scale and possibly with religious overtones could also occur. Inter-ethnic violence seems most likely in places such as Uzgen and Osh, where Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are represented in approximately equal numbers and compete over land and other benefits. Further armed actions by new groups, similar to those launched by the IMU, are possible in remote mountainous and marginalized areas such as Batken, depending on whether the new governments in Afghanistan can reduce funding sources from drug trafficking. But these incursions are unlikely to spread far, as the Kyrgyz and Uzbek armies could join to defeat them. Here again there is a serious possibility in the long term that general economic deterioration and neglect of the southern regions could generate challenges to the northern-dominated central government and make it more difficult for the Bishkek government to hold the country together.

In the short and medium term, of the three regions, significant, widespread violence is the least likely to erupt in the Surkhondaryo area. Although outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence (Uzbek-Tajik) are quite possible, as yet there are no organized forces that could launch a serious security threat to the government. But Surkhondaryo has many economic and environmental problems that if left unattended could eventually stimulate violence between ethnic groups and support local rebel movements.

In sum, this analysis tempers more pessimistic perspectives that are commonly found in many journalistic and even analytical treatments of Central Asia, insofar as they imply that serious general violence or armed activity is likely in the short term. While some differentiation is advised regarding the likelihood of various scales of violence or armed force, the analysis underscores the urgency of addressing the potential for increasing state failure due mainly to economic deterioration and the inability of the two central regimes to respond to the increasing dissent in other than repressive ways.

This study then compares the existing programs of the USAID Central Asia Regional Mission with this diagnosis and makes recommendations regarding its overall goals, sectoral priorities, project linkages, programming processes, and USAID relations with other USG agencies and international actors operating in Central Asia. The conclusions are based on a review of USAID and partners' programs as well as prior feedback from the Mission.

A program review first considers whether there are optimal logical or substantive linkages between, on the one hand, the main social, economic, or other goals at which the overall assistance program portfolio are aimed, and, on the other hand, the conflict and peace factors that have been diagnosed as most important in determining the likelihood of violent conflicts in the three regions. In this regard, many of the identified sources of potential conflict and peace capacities are in fact being addressed through current USAID programs and projects. These include socio-economic 'structural' factors, such as unemployment and competition over essential resources, which may be alleviated by projects doing SME loan promotion and water systems development, respectively. Through its partners, USAID is addressing some of the fundamental daily problems that vitally touch the core of many people's lives, such as making it possible to develop more sources of family income. Reducing the scale of basic needs helps to reduce the potential for such problems to become widespread vocalized issues that, if not managed adequately, can reach levels of tension and provoke violence. If this tension is then met by harsh countermeasures, could possibly further escalate into widespread destructive violence and organization of armed activity. USAID/CAR's portfolio is also helping to remedy certain institutional-political and policy weaknesses, such as by providing various training for civil servants.

The matching exercise also highlights diagnosed conflict and peace factors that are not the direct focus of USAID programs. These include population density, youth aspirations and attitudes, families with very low incomes, religious differences, border controls, poor government socio-economic data, recruitment and funding of armed activity, and government practices in repressing perceived opposition groups. This procedure also indicates that some of the sectoral goals that are presently addressed do not show up as leading sources of potential conflict, although there is no presumption that all programs must do so. Such programs include training in health care sector management and marketization, HIV/AIDS reduction, and infectious diseases control. Because the causal relations of programs and projects to the problems they ostensibly address can be complex and require much more specific evaluations, the conclusions that emerge from this kind of matching suggest that many existing emphases are aimed in the right directions, but this is not direct evidence of the presence or absence of actual impacts.

In terms of *how* individual programs seek to obtain leverage on a problem area, it appears that many projects seek to approach the socio-economic needs of individuals or families (e.g., poor housing conditions) through empowering potential beneficiaries to take more informed, effective action vis-à-vis local government authorities, such as thorough skills training, information dissemination, shaping educational content, and dialogue. Examples include apprizing women of their legal rights or informing farmers of their rights under the new Kyrgyzstan land reform law. The expectation of the latter activity, for example, is that farmers' self-advocacy will lead to more knowledgeable and rule-governed implementation of existing legislation by local authorities and thus more land distribution. Through the aggregate effect of all the contacts and actions taken by various categories of interested citizens, on their own behalf or by advocates, the intent is to make administrative institutions themselves more professional and responsive. Similar system reform goals are being pursued in the health care sector. Benefits are expected from not only building individual, family, and small group capacities, but also the capacities of certain kinds of organizations and institutions, e.g., schools. Many of these projects work through non-state actors and organizations at the local rayon or mahalla level, but some operate at the national level in relation to agencies within the central government.

In sum, USAID programs are contributing toward reducing sources of potential conflicts and enhancing capacities for handling tensions non-violently. By spreading skills for seeking redress of grievances more widely and by improving the administrative apparatuses that affect everyday problems of many citizens, the programs provide a kind of safety valve. Failing to take such actions over time could lead to a build up of resentment and frustration that eventually might generate violent actions or an organized armed rebellion. We cannot know exactly how much impact is being realized in relation to the total scale of the conflict sources and peace capacities, because such measurements inherently require more extensive and

in-depth analysis of the projects individually, one by one, than is possible in a month's tour within three regions.

Certain recommendations regarding USAID programs and processes are offered based on the preceding conflict diagnosis and program review. These focus on several levels: overall portfolio goals and sectoral priorities, cross-project linkages and individual projects.

Looking at the overall assistance strategy, it is important to keep in view that these two post-independence countries and their current political elites face immense challenges in basic state-building and economic and political reform and work with relatively few resources in a rapidly globalizing and economically competitive world. These challenges generate serious tensions between winners and losers who are being affected differently by the new ways in which basic economic needs and new opportunities are allocated. Accordingly, it is useful for USAID to think of its overall task as not so much that of promoting the goals of democratization, economic reform, or adherence to human rights each as discrete ends in themselves without factoring in how their pursuit may affect possible violent conflicts and the management of tensions through peaceful means. Depending on how these goals are approached, the resulting social and political change can either be highly disruptive and violent or could improve the prospects for violence prevention and peaceful management of conflict. Thus, the overriding goal of policy should be that of fostering a *peaceful process of transition* toward these various goals.

Regarding sectoral emphases and the main points of entry, the portfolio has a mix of interventions involving service provision, social mobilization targeting particular institutions, and institutional capacity building. In view of the longer-term threats to national stability arising from social and economic stress that were identified, consideration might be given to additional resources for conflict-sensitive projects that deal with youth, local drug markets and use, and secondary and vocational education.

The portfolio also recognizes that while deep-seated structural, so-called 'root' causes of conflict in these two countries need to be addressed through, for example, job creation, these needs are not going to diminish for some time. Therefore, in the meantime, the societies need to be better prepared to handle the emerging social and political tensions procedurally and behaviorally. In this respect, the relatively heavy emphasis on local community mobilization and civil society could be complemented by giving relatively more attention to the governing, administrative, and political infrastructures and processes at the national and central government level. These actors and institutions are vitally shaping these societies' and economies' national policies and thus the overall distribution of resources, for good or ill. In the coming years, formal political processes and institutions that can forge compromises between competing interests will be crucial in deciding whether the arena of national politics becomes ossified, polarized, or seen as contributing to the public interest. Such mainstream institutions will continue to make the key choices that affect the socio-economic status of social groups and thus determine the groups' responses to their treatment by the state.

The portfolio includes some interventions at the diplomatic and leadership levels that target top- or mid-level leaders and their decision-making and behavior. Additional, highly selective initiatives might be considered to reach members of the policy elite, thus taking the central governments at their word that they are committed to gradual economic reform and political liberalization. The current events that have fostered closer relations between the US and these governments around common concerns, such as terrorism and drug trafficking, afford more opportunities to initiate additional forms of informal constructive engagement with regard to internal policies. Such informal dialogue has been carried out in Tajikistan around the peace process, but it could be tried in potential conflict situations with regard to the issues of economic and political transition. These discussions could be conducted on difficult public policy issues, such as corruption or monetary policy — even if the participants appear only nominally receptive to such discussions. This focus would ostensibly aim to help government policymakers undertake better analysis and policymaking. Although the expectation in past programs has been that this would lead to the design of better policies, the aim in the present instance should be the more modest one

of creating relationships and opening minds to new options and approaches, even though the policymaking environment at the top is highly political.

Relatively more attention might also be paid to more immediate potential violence-triggering factors, such as tactics police might use when faced with crowd tensions. This might spell the difference between a peaceful demonstration and a deadly ethnic riot. The weakness of an illegitimate security force might allow an increasingly violent and authoritarian public life to go unchecked, even if development problems ease. However, appropriately trained police might thwart some of the mobilization of violent or armed activity. Thus, the Mission might explore ways it could help to support security sector personnel through training programs, so that conflict resolution and democratic values and principles are fostered within police agencies.

On the level of inter-program and inter-project synergies, USAID could explore more ways to cross-link various partners' programs in a more strategic manner so as to concentrate their energies and achieve a multiplier effect. As part of such an effort in the Ferghana Valley, USAID should explore the utility of creating thematic or sectoral working groups to address issues, such as water, or employment, or public health. Various partners work with different facets of these sectors. Technical working groups, operating internally under USAID auspices or externally with other parties, could bring various perspectives together and seek common solutions, particularly related to conflict. Sometimes cross-sectoral working groups — for example land and water — might also prove helpful.

Social marketing techniques could also be applied to several USAID-funded programs, such as health reforms, housing privatization, or water efficiency, to increase the effectiveness of such program's outreach techniques. In addition, the people of Central Asia need help in learning how to participate in constructive conflict in the marketplace for ideas, such as through the creation of 'public space' for engaging in policy dialogue and civic education. USAID should consider supporting more local and national opportunities where various public policy options can be discussed and debated, both formally and informally, and voice can be given to a wide variety of competing ideas. Several media avenues exist, such as independent television stations, to carry out such public dialogue, which goes beyond the notion of public service announcements. A steering committee for USAID's Ferghana Valley program together with USAID itself could take a more proactive and conflict-sensitive approach to the deployment of partners' resources by being responsible for coordinating and overseeing such cross-project linkages.

Some of USAID's current partners in Central Asia could also be encouraged to build coalitions for national development. Over the next four or five years, the interest groups with which USAID's partners work, including water users associations, small and medium enterprises, and condominium associations, need encouragement and support to form broader coalitions sharing common interests. Such a process will take several years before these coalitions start to achieve critical mass. Eventually, such interest groups could start to work together to overcome the entrenched interests of political elites who currently control large parts of the administrative apparatus and the economies of the countries of the region.

Finally, at the level of individual projects, a recent analysis suggests more attention needs to be paid to the ethnic composition of the staff. The purpose is to model inter-ethnic cooperation and to avoid negative impressions in areas where different competing ethnic groups are settled.

Regarding USAID programming processes, even a more in-depth and comprehensive study cannot be treated as a one-time definitive set of authoritative conclusions regarding precisely which violent conflicts are likely to arise and where or as a cookbook for programming. Instead, for USAID and its partners to carry out an effective conflict prevention program in the Ferghana Valley and elsewhere in Central Asia, it would be advisable to set up an ongoing system for monitoring the key factors affecting conflict and peace, including local, national and regional developments as well as US and other policies, for strategy development. That monitoring process could then be used as a basis for guiding policy practice at several levels where choices are made. Since it is not clear where precise hot spots or crises points may develop,

early warning systems would help to track potential conflict areas so that appropriate flexibility could be incorporated to deploy USAID's resources for conflict prevention responses in terms of their geographic area foci, sectoral emphasis, and methods of attack.

An effective program to achieve peaceful transitions cannot be achieved by USAID and its partners alone, however. While USAID rightly is seeing the prevention of violent conflicts as a central concern, conflict prevention cannot be left exclusively to the development and humanitarian instruments that operate primarily within countries. Conflict prevention must also be implemented through US inter-state diplomacy as well as military relations with central governments. The success of this strategy can build on the amicable relations that exist between the USAID missions and the embassies in the two countries.

In particular, the closer relations that are being established for strategic reasons between the US armed forces and the two governments should be used as a vehicle for creating more contact with and between these governments on a range of domestic and inter-state issues affecting the region's stability and development. The global emphasis on combating terrorism is throwing more weight behind security efforts in the narrow, technical sense, but should be balanced by the tasks of providing political access to a range of emerging interests and building legitimate state institutions that enact economically productive policies. In view of the heightened visibility that each country is receiving due to the presence of new international missions, the opportunity to promote the policy goals that are needed to ensure conflict prevention and peace building within these countries must be actively seized. It is recommended that USAID take deliberate steps to engage other US agencies in discussing the specifics of an integrated US conflict prevention and peace building strategy for the Central Asian countries.

Similarly, no single donor can expect to exert great leverage on the multiple sources of possible emerging conflicts, for recipient countries are often skilled at playing different donors off one another to avoid tough decisions. The most cost-effective way to implement one's own programs is to seek ways in which they can be reinforced and complemented by those of other actors to achieve maximum impact. In Central Asia, the Swiss, German and Dutch development agencies are active in peace-building programs, and the UN, OSCE, ADB, World Bank, IMF, and NATO are significant multilateral actors. Thus, USAID should build into its normal programming procedures specific points at which it regularly consults with these other actors regarding the situation and the resources they collectively bring to bear on it.

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PART I. RATIONALE AND APPROACH

Policy Context and Focus of the Report

Since the horrible Rwanda genocide of 1994, USAID and other major bilateral and multi-lateral development agencies have begun to focus on the destructive effects that newly arising intra-state conflicts, such as those in Somalia, Yugoslavia and East Timor, have had on developing countries and on donors' assistance programs. This concern goes beyond the humanitarian role that donor agencies traditionally play in relieving the victims of wars. It also differs from the growing post-conflict nation-building responsibilities they undertake once civil conflicts reach peace settlements and peacekeeping forces depart. This concern involves the task of conflict *prevention*: "Can violent intra-state conflicts be kept from erupting in the first place?"[1]

Two policy questions are central to this concern:

- How can development programs become more sensitive to the sources of such conflicts, so that they do not make conflicts worse ("do no harm")?

- How can development programs be applied so they contribute to reducing the emerging potential for violent conflicts ("do some good")?[2]

In this context, several reports in recent years have warned of the instability and potential for violent conflict in the five newly independent states of post-Soviet Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Following the end of the Cold War, the US and other Western countries had not given much attention to this region, apart from the problem of removing Kazakhstan's nuclear weapons and the interests of US oil companies in exploring new sources. But by the mid-1990s, Washington and other capitols became aware of the prospect that conflict similar to the civil war in Yugoslavia, which resulted from internal rivalries after it declared independence in 1991, might occur in Central Asian states. In 1999 and 2000, armed incursions into Central Asia by an Islam-inspired group and anonymous bombings in downtown Tashkent helped to rivet this attention.

The potential for increased instability in the region was high, especially in the populous and intensively cultivated Ferghana Valley, which is shared by three of the countries. Ruled in the past by a succession of authoritarian empires, all these countries were untested as independent states or sound nations, much less as democracies. Their economies were designed largely to supply raw materials to manufacturers and processors elsewhere within a Soviet economy, which was now substantially disassembled. Their political structures had mainly served the aims of local communist control, not local acceptance. It was unclear whether these new states could provide an adequate standard of living to their populations and could reconcile the contending interests of their several awakening ethnic, religious, and regional communities. The former communists who became their leaders were now vigorously engaged in nation-building through the resurrection of unifying historical mythologies and the promulgation of new national ideologies in which most citizens still took considerable pride. The possibility remained, however, that these politically undefined states would fall apart, succumbing to blame and conflict under failure when met with the challenges of nation-building.

Surrounded by more powerful countries in the region — China and Iran on one axis, and Russia, Pakistan, and India on the other — each of which had interests in it, added to the pressures that threatened these countries' internal stability. Although poor and landlocked, the states possessed valuable oil and gas reserves and other natural resources. In addition to geo-political uncertainties, observers saw them as vulnerable to takeover by imported and radical forms of political Islam.

The question that interested USAID policymakers was whether underneath this smoke was a fire. What were the real chances of violent intra-state or inter-state conflict? How could US policy best be designed and implemented to address the situation? Accordingly, the USAID Central Asia Regional Mission asked Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI) to:

> "… Conduct an assessment of current USAID programming and determine how existing programming could be better tailored to prevent conflict in Central Asia, specifically the Ferghana Valley region of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and southern Uzbekistan."

Although it had previously undertaken an intensive effort to formulate a comprehensive development strategy for the region, the mission sought assistance in taking a fresh look at the potential for violent conflicts, and in assessing possible implications for USAID's programming, so that the limited aid funds available could be applied most cost-effectively. Analysts were asked to concentrate on the Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan areas of the Ferghana Valley (FV) and southern Uzbekistan. This also required looking at national trends in both countries as well as regional influences. Examining Tajikistan's part of the valley was cancelled for security reasons.

The field work for this study began one day before the September 11 attacks in the US and their aftermath in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, just to the south of three of the Central Asian states. The investigators completed the field work and left the region a month later, on the day before the American military began bombing in Afghanistan. Though the ripple effects from these rapid and dramatic events were only beginning to be felt in the region, they presented new factors that affected key aspects of the analysis.

For example, sizeable new US aid and loan packages for Uzbekistan were promised at the end of November. Cabinet-level US officials of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan made repeated visits. In early December, it appeared that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the armed group whose incursions had attracted attention to the region, might have been virtually decimated during the rapid collapse of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. Though events were unfolding and could not be fully addressed, such developments affected the risk of certain conflicts as well as the status and future of national and regional peace-building capacities.

The leading issue at stake for US policy was whether the US's greater interest in the region and its closer working relationships with its governments would reduce or increase the prospects for instability within these societies. While the anti-terrorist coalition alleviated some of the larger powers' rivalries over Central Asia, would it also help to buttress slight momentum toward inter-state cooperation within the region or, after the crisis, give way to a modern version of the 'Great Game?'

In the short term, the populations of these countries were generally supportive of the anti-terrorist campaign and of its respective governments. The long-term question is whether the US would seize this opportunity to balance security assistance with political development, or instead take a politically indifferent approach that disregarded the governments' sometimes repressive policies and other domestic policy weaknesses. The latter could potentially sow the seeds of future violent conflicts. Several observers feared that, if the US were to support the provision of "hardware" such as power and transport infrastructure but overlook the policy "software" needed to build effective domestic institutions, it could foster a popular upheaval.

Methods of Analysis and Report Structure

The team sought a method designed to answer certain diagnostic and prescriptive questions, distilled from the Statement of Work and put into a logical sequence, and to examine appropriate sources of data. A large amount of social and program information and analytical materials were collected and analyzed, and scores of interviews were conducted in the region and in Washington. The evidence is drawn mainly from the post-independence period, unless earlier developments were relevant.

The approach gave precedence to the diagnostic task of looking first at the factors that could produce violent conflicts or that could transform tensions and disputes into peaceful forms of conflict. The first step was to determine whether typical sources of violent conflict existed in significant measure and whether existing capacities could manage them peacefully. Early warning systems and research on the leading causes of contemporary armed intra-state conflicts were used to formulate a 'checklist' of possible factors. This was derived from extant empirical research on the leading causes of contemporary violent intra-state conflicts and on the less-known case literature on intra-state conflict prevention.

Applying these questions to each geographic area, the team also examined whether differing kinds of violent conflict might be forming. As we applied these questions in each geographic area, we asked ourselves whether certain differing kinds and levels of violent conflict might be in the making there. Obviously, different magnitudes and bases for conflict would have different valences for the stability and progress of the region and would call for different policy responses. The main possible types of conflict we looked for were:

- Inter-state conflicts
  - Water, energy or environment
  - Security threats
  - Territory and borders
  - Cross-border ethnic attachments

- Intra-state conflicts
  - Control and nature of the state, state policies, state failure, or secession (challenges to central government authority)
  - Sub-national ethnic, religious, or other communal identity groups
  - Land or other resource allocation among local communities or groups (including cross-border disputes)

The main conclusions from this diagnostic or conflict assessment are presented in Part II below.

Once the dimensions of the potential conflicts were gauged, it became possible to address whether the solutions used to date have been appropriate or whether others might be contemplated. Part III addresses this second concern, namely the positive and negative impacts that current programs might be having on potential conflicts. Building on those analyses, Part IV turns to the prescriptive by looking at how USAID's current programming could respond to the diagnosed potential for conflict. The team considered actions that would continue or expand existing policies and programs, terminate them, modify them, or supplement them with new efforts.

Caveat

Because of the large amount of societal and program data, the number of people interviewed, and the many issues of interpretation, USAID should understand the limits of this analysis. While the authors'

method was firmly grounded in previous work in this field and considerable data, it represents only the best diagnostic and prescriptive judgments possible within the time period allotted for the study. It was not possible to look in depth, for example, at the many different projects at work in the regions studied. Methods of close program evaluation using peace and conflict impact criteria also could not be fully applied here.

But even a more in-depth and comprehensive study than this one should not be treated as a one-time definitive set of authoritative conclusions regarding precisely which violent conflicts are likely to arise and where, nor as a cookbook for programming. Such a usage would misunderstand the complex and changing dynamics of likely conflicts and the current inability to precisely identify their ingredients, as well as overestimate the current capacity to ascertain program impacts. Instead, the analysis should be used heuristically. While it is not appropriate to use the report as a crystal ball for predicting the future or a complete blueprint for programming, this study does apply a useful method for conflict assessment and program review and come to grounded conclusions. Regarding possible conflicts, it provides testable hypotheses, the substance of which would temper the more pessimistic perspectives commonly found in many journalistic treatments of Central Asia. The report's policy recommendations might also help to cast new light on USAID's current program portfolio. The report should be used as a model for an analytical process that should be replicated in USAID and its partners' activities, thus allowing for more in-depth analysis that would monitor conditions and programming on a continuing basis.

PART II: THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENT CONFLICTS

Focuses

This section addresses the following questions:

1. Is there a significant potential for violent conflicts to break out in the areas surveyed, in view of their current capacities for peaceful management?

2. If so, what types and scale of conflicts are most likely, and when?

This section briefly lays out some of the sources of potential conflict and the main factors restraining them. The exposition offers some 'bottom-line' judgments about the likelihood of conflict breaking out, which are offered in the Conclusions. These discussions also show which sources of conflict or capacities for peace are present. Such factors point the reader to various 'entry points' that could receive policy attention — i.e., sources of violent conflict that need to be reduced and capacities for peace that could be strengthened. These are given in the Findings.

Entry Points for Leverage

This or any analysis does not control the future of these countries — it only assigns possibilities, or at best, probabilities. Whether conflict in fact transpires depends largely on whether the negative or positive factors in the analysis win out. This outcome depends in turn on whether domestic and international actors actually act to influence these as-yet undetermined trajectories.

Therefore, the diagnosis should not simply be used passively, as a definitive *predictor* of whether conflict will erupt and when. Instead, it should be used as a *pointer* to the most important negative and positive factors ('variables') on which the actual future prospects of conflict hang. If it is roughly on target, and the leverage points noted are addressed vigorously, violent conflict could be deterred. On the other hand, if the factors identified are left unattended to await more serious signs of crisis, it could become too late, and uncontrollably violent conflicts are more likely to ensue. Prevention is thus best approached as a

rolling process, not simply a one-time response launched a few moments before an explosion. Accordingly, in each of the three sections focusing on a particular region below, after summarizing the conclusions about the prospects for conflict, the key factors at play are highlighted.

A Conflict Prevention Checklist

Each discussion below addresses the following broad questions. They probe for both the sources and the drivers of conflict and the capacities for peace or regulators of conflict.

DRIVERS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

1. Predisposing Factors: What structural conditions are generating a clash of interests between significant groups in society?

2. Enabling Factors: Which organizations have clashing interests, what are the grievances of particular groups, and who is mobilizing supporters to promote their common interests? What contentious political issues are surfacing and being disputed by different parties? To what extent are these parties obtaining the resources needed to take specific *collective* action that could become violent or coercive?

3. Triggering Factors: What specific events are raising public tensions by overtly expressing interests in a violent or coercive way or are likely to provoke such expressions?

REGULATORS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

1. Mitigating Factors: What structural conditions are easing the clash of interests?

2. Accommodating Factors: How effective are major processes and institutions (for example, patronage networks or new forms of democracy) in controlling or alleviating the social and economic problems perceived as potential sources of conflict? To what extent are processes and institutions helping reach compromises between clashing interests?

3. Restraining Factors: What specific acts or events, such as public speech, discourage, suppress, or limit the violent expressions of interests, and transform them into conciliatory and reciprocal behavior?

The answer to these inquiries leads to a summary judgment of the risk of violent conflict and the chances of peaceful progress. The result of applying this method is evident in the sections below.

This analysis diverges somewhat from the prevailing 'boiling pot' theory of conflict that lies behind most previous studies and recent practitioners' proposals regarding the FV. This theory tends to assume that a list of socio-economic distresses will multiply to spark massive violence and that widespread popular frustration can quickly be ignited by extremists. The sheer existence and number of social and economic distresses, such as poverty, polluted drinking water, and corruption, are assumed to be sources of conflict.

Unfortunately, this style of analysis is not as specific about the sources, situational dynamics, sites, scale, and timetable of possible conflicts:

- The social maladies that are catalogued do not necessarily affect the same specific areas or groups in society at the same time. To materialize, specific conflicts need several factors reinforcing each other before they are likely to erupt. These analyses note different problems in different groups and

locations that will not necessarily aggregate in a way that puts extraordinary pressure on the status quo in any one place, or in ways that cannot be absorbed or compensated.

- The need is largely ignored for conflicts to have specific, concrete agents (e.g., 'ethnic entrepreneurs,' political factions, coup leaders, rebel movements, etc.) who require sufficient financing, political following, and weapons before they can effectively mobilize and outmaneuver police or security forces on a sustained basis. Such agents are still quite weak, within Uzbekistan especially, and so far, state security forces have contained them relatively easily.

- There is also a populist assumption that conflict must always arise from discontent among a country's masses, whereas it also can arise from struggles within and between top-level elites.

- The existing paradigm also fails to examine the already-existing capacities for suppressing such conflicts or peacefully managing them. Or if these are listed, there is little effort to estimate their impact on transforming or suppressing conflicts. Local, national, regional and global processes and institutions for conflict management and containment are usually operating in some degree and offset the conditions that generate grievances; keep them from erupting into higher-level, sustained armed conflicts; or if they do erupt, keep them from escalating or spreading. In other words, the balance sheet needs to look at credits as well as debits. The bottom line issue is whether the former are sufficient to exceed the latter in both the short and long term.

Uzbekistan Areas of Ferghana Valley (FV)

Conclusions

The potential for the outbreak of *widespread* violent conflict in the Uzbekistan FV, caused by potential factors such as Islamic extremists, inter-ethnic clashes, government human rights abuses, or water and land problems, is low. But in the short and long terms, several varieties of conflict are possible at different levels:

- In the short term (one to three years), relatively minor outbreaks of localized violence are quite possible. In particular, scattered eruptions in the FV at the village and town levels involving disputes over water and land are likely, such as in the areas where the valley begins to meet foothills. Some of these fracases could be inter-ethnic and/or cross-border in nature — but not all. Those that are, are not likely to provoke sustained armed conflict either within or between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, although there may be moments of tension and confrontation.

- The recurrent inter-state water and energy disputes are not expected to escalate into military confrontations or armed conflict. The trend instead is toward give-and-take by reaching inter-governmental agreements on these issues. The continuing uncertainty of such negotiations, however, does not contribute to better bilateral relations.

- The most serious conflicts facing the country could occur in the longer term as an outcome of state failure. These include those that might occur at the local level but also the possibility of covert and overt conflict at the national level in the form of political challenges to the current national government, over whether power should be concentrated at the center or divided among the sub-national regions. Depending on the government's response, these challenges to state authority could become increasingly violent and could spawn armed movements.

In short, attention should be focused primarily on the prospects for intra-state conflict rather than inter-state conflict, with different forms and scales likely to arise in the short term and the long term.

Findings

Predisposing and Mitigating Structural Conditions. The large number of people who populate the FV, now exceeding 27 percent of Uzbekistan's 25.2 million population, continues to increase rapidly, due to Uzbekistan's high birth rate. This puts a strain on the existing arable land, water, and government resources and increases the likelihood that declines in average standards of living in the rural areas will continue unless major policy changes are made.

Uzbekistan's economy relies heavily on income from raw materials such as oil, natural gas, gold and cotton, of which it is the world's third largest producer. It is also a regional exporter of chemicals and machinery. Though the average income of workers in industry and services has remained level, the real incomes of rural families, most of who work on collective farms, have declined rapidly due to reduced yields from drought, inefficient use of water, and inflation. The few independent farmers who farm their own land often have difficulty obtaining sufficient water from upstream areas, within or across borders, to irrigate their crops. Because water from the mountains in some areas is polluted, potable water is sometimes scarce.

In the FV's several medium-sized cities, the ending of Soviet-era subsidies for industry, science, and culture; the closing of Soviet industries and regional markets; and the slow growth of new industry, businesses, and professions have contributed to 25 percent or more unemployment in some towns. These numbers might be higher because unemployed workers often do not register due to advantages in staying nominally on an employer's rolls. For many active workers, wage payments are in arrears. The average income levels in different towns of the FV vary considerably, with those in Namangan, for example, falling below the national average while Andijan sits above the national average. Average income throughout the valley generally exceeds, however, the national average. In addition, large numbers of youth are receiving secondary or higher education, but their prospects for obtaining jobs are limited. About 43 percent of the FV population is under 16 years of age. Nationwide, the number of families estimated to be in poverty is increasing, as are disparities between higher and lower income groups.

There are many signs of overall economic decline, but it is unevenly distributed and it has not been precipitous.

There are social and cultural cleavages in the FV that, although still latent, could increasingly define groups that come in conflict as general socio-economic problems worsen. With the opening of many new mosques and religious schools under the new independence, a majority of Uzbeks follow Islamic practices or identify with its doctrines. But the people in some Uzbek communities in the valley such as Namangan tend to be more conservative in their values and more religious in their beliefs, and thus in that sense more 'fundamentalist' than their more secular, fellow citizens. A less obvious, potential cultural conflict might surface between those who follow conservative styles of life, whether influenced by Islam or the government's own campaign to instill moral values and those who opt for explicitly 'liberal' secular and materialist values.

Certain structural factors work against the clashing of distinct interests in the Uzbek FV, however. Ethnicity is not a major cleavage because ethnic Uzbeks predominate. Its largely ethnic Uzbek population does not feel threatened by serious competition with other ethnic groups. The Russian and other smaller minorities are relatively powerless, but are not in conspicuously privileged positions. Government efforts have been made to instill a pan-ethnic Uzbek nationalism that incorporates all groups rather than distinguishes among them. While bloody inter-ethnic clashes erupted in 1990 in the valley, the desire not to repeat them seems to have some influence on people's thinking. Other than those clashes, there are no strong, abiding legacies of repeated bitter conflict between specific major groups.

Spot observations and conversations in markets also suggest that an increasing numbers of small entrepreneurs are benefiting from new business opportunities, and a spirit of busy-ness and enterprise seems to pervade the FV cities' bazaars. Offsetting economic hardship are the small land plots on which families grow food and a 'gray' market of informal employment that helps to support many workers' families. Nothing approaching the sense of despair and ferment that emanates from the teeming masses on the streets of many African capitals, for example, is evident in the FV, whose considerable vitality seems the more noticeable trait.[3]

Conflict Enabling or Accommodating Factors. Current government policies largely limit the opportunities for rural families to obtain a livelihood, and families are confined mainly to collective cotton farms. Though small amounts of state arable land are being privatized, it is not choice soil. Still, competition over obtaining it seems to be growing among individual farmers and between Uzbek and minority ethnic groups. In the short and medium term, the country may see even stronger border controls, which impede economic growth and discourage the efficient movement of labor, goods, and services. Meanwhile, responsibility for the social safety net has shifted to local government at the same time that social and health service provisions are being cut back. In an environment of fewer jobs and declining social services, access to vital needs increasingly is obtained through bribery. This increases the resentment felt toward government officials and stirs suspicions of favoritism among differing groups and areas.

Notwithstanding these growing social and economic pressures and largely unresponsive central government policies, the valley has yet to see a significant social or political force publicly articulate the widely felt problems and effectively galvanize large numbers of people to apply pressure on or threaten the status quo. Apart from the intense criticisms of scattered human right advocates, the growing social hardship of many Uzbekistan citizens has yet to be articulated in the form of political grievances by any parties or movements that command wide loyalty. Consequently, complaints simply constitute occasional and diffuse expressions of suffering in search of both a constituency and a champion.

The only anti-system organizations that advocate political programs are underground. A group of dedicated members of the underground group Hezb-i-Tahrir distribute anti-government pamphlets calling for a region-wide Caliphate through non-violent change. While drawing on Islamic beliefs in a country that is estimated to be 88 percent Muslim, they do not command a significant following. Although it has members in many other countries, so far this group appears to be widely viewed as irrelevant by most Uzbeks. Its program does not appear to resonate with them, perhaps because it has not tapped into most people's more material complaints.

The openly violent armed movement, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), held some appeal for the residents of the mountainous areas that it temporarily controlled during its short-lived incursions in 1999 and 2000, largely it seems by virtue of the economic and social benefits it provided to needy, marginalized communities. But rather than advancing a coherent political program, the IMU restricted itself to armed actions, thwarted by the more powerful and increasingly well-trained Uzbek army and interior forces. The security forces keep the IMU from establishing a lasting hold anywhere and thus presenting a credible alternative to the government. An insurgency is also inherently difficult to sustain in flat areas such as the valley. Though the Uzbek border controls have caused immense inconvenience for valley residents, they are one factor that has limited the success of rebel activity.

Because the IMU would need more powerful weapons to achieve significant military gains, its financial prospects look dim because the war in Afghanistan and the anti-terrorism global campaign has eliminated Osama bin Laden's ability to fund it. In fact, the IMU itself might no longer be a serious security threat to Uzbekistan. Its ranks might have been drastically reduced by the recent fighting in Afghanistan, which destroyed the Taliban and led to the takeover of northern Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance. Credible reports also indicate that Juma Namangani, its leader who came from the FV, was captured and

subsequently killed in Kunduz when the city fell to the Northern Alliance. Olivier Roy, a longtime observer of events in the region, believes these events spell the virtual end of the IMU, at least in its present form.

In short, political Islamic sentiments have not been translated into a viable political or military challenge. The question remains, however, whether remnants of the IMU or other new armed insurgencies could grow and once again threaten the FV. One thing such groups require to be viable and effective is financing, and drug trafficking was one of the funding sources for the IMU. The future prospects for drug trafficking affecting the Uzbekistan FV is crucial and is discussed in Appendix B.

A key factor that will also determine how significant alternatives to the present regime become is the country's response to problems of the current regime itself. Overseeing and dominating Uzbekistan's governing structure is its energetic President Islam Karimov. Under the communist government, Karimov served on the State Planning Committee, as Minister of Finance, and then as First Secretary of the Communist Party, after which he was elected President of the Republic even before independence was declared. A published economist, he is a visionary leader in some respects and he still commands much respect from the people and elite alike.

President Karimov appoints all governors at the provincial (*oblast*) and local (*rayon*) levels. Rather than parceling out decision-making responsibility to many bureaus and to local as well as central government levels (spreading the blame for public problems), he frequently reassigns officials and portfolios to maintain central control and avoid the risk of competing power centers. In addition to directing the governmental civil administration, he apparently also controls the army and interior intelligence services, thus thrusting executive control deeply into the social fabric. Although other political parties are allowed, Karimov and his reshaped communist political party successfully outmaneuvered the proto-opposition parties that sprang up during the years of glasnost. He has shaped the composition and programs of subsequent parties, so there has been no effective public political competition for the presidential office, and political parties provide no effective channels for representing broad interests in societies such as the peasantry. The 2000 presidential election that gave Karimov another five-year term was criticized by the OSCE as neither free nor fair. Indeed, the government has treated all forms of suspected political opposition so harshly that many observers believe this is a potential source of violent conflict in itself (see Triggers below).

The prevailing economic philosophy seems to be inspired by the Turkish model for modernizing a traditional society combined with East Asian models of economic development, in which the state is envisioned as the chief reformer that must take on the task of national tutelage. The mercantilist Uzbek domestic economic policy has been guided by a self-conscious choice to move slowly toward privatizing state-run industries and agriculture, and it maintains a high proportion of spending on government. The country's gold, oil, gas, and cotton exports and its largely agrarian economy provided a cushion against some of the initial shock of the loss of Soviet markets and allowed the government to expand education. An import substitution strategy has discouraged opening the country to foreign trade. Some Turkish and American investments also have helped support the economy.

The government has pledged itself explicitly to serve certain national goals: gradual transition to a market economy, social protection from the costs of that transition, the rule of law, and education. Yet it lacks a cadre of secure technocrats who have knowledge of the market economics that helped the Asian tigers to grow and spread social benefits. Instead, its overstaffed central bureaucracies include many former apparatchiks who are untrained in methods of modern public administration and public policy, and they are highly inefficient and unresponsive in serving public needs. The parliament exercises little influence on legislation and no discipline over executive operations. This not only removes a potential source of policy and political guidance for the bureaucracy, but also closes a channel whereby potential new

entrants into politics might "buy into the system." Since few sources of alternative policy ideas exist, it is difficult to see how innovations can be promoted and tried or how failures in government policies can be corrected.

Government policy is largely set by presidential decrees and regulations, and at lower levels, by informal deals unguided by price or efficiency considerations and thus subject to considerable corruption. Not surprisingly, this highly centralized system, dominated by the president, has not taken many meaningful steps toward the market, such as privatizing state enterprises, lifting price controls, or removing subsidies and quotas. The government still dominates the banking sector, trade, procurement and marketing, and tightly regulates the private sector that does exists, which remains at only 10 percent of GDP. When the government felt forced to institute economic reforms, such as in 1994-95, it reversed them in the following years. Its reluctance to pursue reforms prompted the IMF to suspend a stand-by economic support agreement with the government. Although laws have been passed to support small and medium enterprises (SMEs) through training and incubators, this government program has been implemented slowly and is only modestly funded.

President Karimov has complained publicly of the lack of even basic financial, employment, and demographic statistics that are needed for a centrally planned economy. Government social and economic data regarding the rate of inflation and employment are regarded as unreliable and differ considerably from independently gathered data. But the government perseveres in maintaining tight control of virtually all decision making.

Especially over the past five years, this system has resulted in declining foreign investment, reduced exports, a declining balance of payments, higher debt, inflation, and increasing capital flight. The continuation of overly restrictive central policies affecting investment, tax, trade, the currency, agriculture, and the promotion of new industries are inhibiting the ability of international investors and domestic entrepreneurs to promote new business enterprises on a scale that could employ large numbers of people. A major, widely criticized obstacle to foreign investment is its non-convertible currency. In addition, the government's efforts to allow private peasant farms and small landholdings are not efficient for boosting agriculture production and will not generate enough jobs.[4]

At the same time, however, certain political safety valves have been used. National fiscal policies increase government spending in times of drought, support job creation schemes, and provide benefits through a meager social welfare system. This helped the country weather the Russian financial collapse of 1998. Locally, some government officials and community-level *mahallas* have considerable latitude to serve public needs. They gauge local tensions and act as a quasi-representative body, albeit at a grassroots level and in a way that is watched or controlled through agents from the central government. NGO's have also cropped up to work with some local authorities and mahallas to address and remedy the most egregious social problems. These processes might be taking some of the steam out of potential protests and outbreaks of violence.

This discussion has focused so far on the current situation, which reveals potential problems but no immediate crises. Perhaps the most likely scenario in the coming years, however, would see both continued economic decline and the failure to undertake a gradual evolution toward real political pluralism, thus encouraging increasingly political and even violent challenges to the current regime. If some acceptable trend in economic growth is not achieved, tensions and bitter competition will increase in a growing population with rising expectations. The combination of the negative impacts on the economy of restrictive macro-economic and trade policies and the kleptocratic pattern of decision making could very well outpace the potential signs of broadly distributed economic growth that otherwise exists in the FV. Even though the intellectual rationale behind the current policy strategy is thought-through and even if the President himself is sincere about achieving the goals he has set, it is hard to envision how

current policies can avoid political pressures to keep most of the significant wealth-producing enterprises and the distribution of lucrative government contracts within the hands of the members of the large clans and patronage networks, thus further impoverishing the wider society.

If economic conditions continue to worsen, the social contract that the government itself has promulgated will be more clearly seen as failing to deliver, and the regime will be discredited. Within the regime, this can spur increasing competition among factions over a shrinking pie. Outside of it, more groups will arise from opposition parties and feel emboldened to challenge the regime, and they could gain wider public legitimacy and support. Either existing or new opposition movements could gain more followers, whether motivated by Islamic, populist, or other ideologies or some combination of them. As it experiences new political life, for example, Hezb-i-Tahrir could become a more viable carrier of widening discontent, and if blocked from open political activity, it could decide to drop its non-violent philosophy and tactics. It or other new armed rebel movements could receive support from sympathetic and desperate mountainous communities that the government has failed to serve and has difficulty reaching.

An alternative safety-valve for maintaining a modicum of stability would be available if more vital electoral, party, and representative institutions were built up that could absorb or co-opt the likely growing tensions. But given the absence of both economic growth and political flexibility, it seems the regime will fail to produce the goods it has promised. It is more likely that within the next 10 years or less, various political opposition groups will grow up from outside and from within and capitalize on the rising societal problems and the deterioration of state legitimacy and authority. Divisive forces motivated by 'grievance' and 'greed' could fight against each other or collaborate in unpredictable ways, weakening the regime and eroding the present level of political cohesion. In such an unraveling situation, it is not clear where the loyalties of the armed forces and police would be.

In addition, a major potential political threat may arise from the population moving into the several sizeable urban areas of the FV and its growing pool of largely young and educated but un- or under-employed youth and families. According to some analyses, the outlines of a constituency for political action may already be forming that includes government workers who have not been paid for months or years, and low-wage farm, industrial, and construction workers. So far, people who complain publicly tend to blame local authorities and corruption for society's problems. But increasingly, information from more sophisticated poverty surveys and other social statistics could filter down to the public and to young and aspiring alternative political leaders. They could then galvanize an emerging group of frustrated 'new poor' that collects in the tenements of the cities around an emergent collective identity.[5]

Such a constituency might be animated by a populist anti-market ideology, for example, that combines the fondly remembered communist norm of social equality with the principles of justice, order and morality of Islam, for these values are deeply felt at the local level. Because these principles are not alien to the government's own paternalistic social welfare rhetoric, they could be turned against it. That group could then be radicalized if government security forces crack down on any demonstrations, even though they may be conducted peacefully. But even if they succeeded in toppling the regime without a major destructive armed conflict, the resulting regime would probably not be any more open to reform and pluralism than the present one.

Unless the present regime has generally proven itself, whoever becomes the second post-independence leader of Uzbekistan will also be less secure in his or her position than the founding father has been so far. Internal regime struggles may create incentives for high-level individuals to take more extreme positions by 'outbidding' the others through playing to particular constituencies, such as heightening the ethnic consciousness of ethnic Uzbeks and scapegoating the country's minorities.

In sum, the central governing system that so far has enlisted considerable, tacit support from the general population while suppressing dissidents on the fringe by postponing difficult economic reforms, will undermine the ultimate ability of the economy to produce sufficient jobs and income to satisfy its growing population and a rising younger generation. As it becomes more vulnerable to increasing resentment, cracks could increasingly emerge that lead to its ultimate breakdown.

To complicate matters, even if more reforms are enacted, a genuine dilemma arises that will require very adept political statecraft and sensitive, politically-informed international policies. More vigorous and authentic privatization and reduced government spending would also threaten many of the current elite's short-term commercial interests as well as cause more general suffering and increase the mass' sense of discontent. Privatizing more of the state could provoke intra-regime infighting between the so-called "clans" who have competed in dividing up the spoils so far. So the future is made even more complex when one considers that even the needed economic reforms are not a solution solely in themselves, because their political effects could upset the existing equilibrium that the prevailing patronage system has accomplished so far.

Clearly, a great deal rides on the direction taken in the coming years by central government elites and their policies and thus the dynamics of the regime's internal politics. The future will hinge on whether the current official policy and political doctrine that pledges gradual moves toward a market economy can actually be carried out by the present governing elite. That in turn will reflect what external forces can do to influence their direction.

Triggers and Restraints. In the context of increasing decline, a number of specific events could crystallize perceptions and resort to allegiances. Although the government attributed them to Islamic extremists, the bomb explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 that were seemingly directed at the President remain unexplained. This sows uncertainty as to whether the government can control covert threats to security. Although they were quickly contained, the incidents caused by the IMU have helped the government to rationalize increasing military spending and have given them pardon for harsh tactics toward ordinary citizens who are suspected of unlawful activities. Police arrests of many individuals accused of subversive political activity merely because they are religious devotees is said to be increasing the insecurity of many devout but non-political followers of Islam, radicalizing some of them, thus adding to the ranks of extremists.

Its presidential system makes Uzbekistan's political stability heavily dependent on the adroit balancing skills of Uzbekistan's first president. This keeps the stakes of central decision-making high and increases the competition over who will succeed President Karimov. While some of the clan networks can be cultivated some of the time, all of them cannot be cultivated all of the time. Up until the recent Parliament decision to extend the present incumbent's tenure to life, the decision as to who would succeed Karimov to run in the 2004 presidential election was seen as a possible event that could precipitate a regime crisis. Some analysts thought the ruling inner circle would make the selection, and insiders have hinted that the Mayor of Tashkent was already the heir apparent. This matter may still be an occasion for tension, however, since Karimov, although only 63 years old, is rumored to have cancer.

So far, however, few provocative acts or triggering events have increased tensions by expressing interests violently or provoking such expressions. Further, the attacks on Afghanistan have so far not caused widespread dislocations throughout the region, and the anti-insurgency vigilance maintained by the Uzbek security forces continue to enjoy public support. This represents a favorable circumstance, if it is used to buy time to develop the country in order to immunize it against future threats by armed groups or outbreaks of violence. Though discontent might be sparked, it could fizzle in the damp soil of a basically content population. But that window of opportunity will not last forever and needs to be seized.

Kyrgyzstan Areas of Ferghana Valley

Conclusions

Violent conflicts at the village level and in urban areas are somewhat more likely in the short term in areas of the FV Kyrgyzstan than in FV Uzbekistan. Occasional localized violence over water issues is expected, as in Uzbekistan. Inter-ethnic violence on a somewhat larger scale and possibly with religious overtones could occur, especially in places like Uzgen and Osh, where significant numbers of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz meet, are represented in somewhat equal numbers, and compete over land and other benefits.

Also, depending heavily on whether the new governments in Afghanistan affect funding sources from drug trafficking, after some years further armed actions of the sort launched by the IMU but by new groups are possible in remote mountainous and marginalized areas such as Batken. But these are unlikely to spread far, for the Kyrgyz and Uzbek armies might join to defeat them. In the longer run, there is a serious possibility that economic deterioration and neglect could generate challenges from the southern regions to the northern-dominated central government and make it more difficult for the Bishkek government in the north to hold the country together.

Findings

Predisposing and Mitigating Structural Conditions. Kyrgyzstan has many of the same socio-economic structural problems as Uzbekistan. Though smaller in area and having only about 4.7 million inhabitants, its population density is high in the urban areas to which more rural Kyrgyz are migrating. The mainly young population is increasing rapidly, poverty and unemployment are very high, average income is declining, many workers are not paid regularly, and income inequalities are worsening. The standard of living in the urban areas significantly exceeds that in the rural areas. Education and literary levels are relatively high, but the growing, youthful, educated generation is increasingly unable to find jobs at home and are going to the capitol or leaving the country. Polluted water is common. Generally, the southern oblasts of the Kyrgyzstan FV are worse on these measures than the northern oblasts.

Unfortunately, Kyrgyzstan prospects for achieving significant, sustained economic growth may be even bleaker than Uzbekistan's, largely because its agricultural and other natural endowments are much fewer. Most of its territory is mountainous and much of it is inhabited by pastoral communities. Only 7 percent of the land is arable. Though the abundant water flowing from the mountains is essential for its down-river neighbors and has great hydro-electric potential, Kyrgyzstan is less industrialized than Uzbekistan and even more dependent on common primary commodity exports, such as cotton. With the exception of some mining of gold and precious metals, and some potential for tourism, it has less capacity to market competitive goods that are valued in regional or world markets.

The ethnic make-up of the people populating the Kyrgyzstan FV, represents a higher percentage of ethnic Uzbeks in relation to the ethnic Kyrgyz than the 14 percent they represent in the population of the country as a whole. Such a concentration of two ethnic groups can provide a basis for mobilizing collective action along ethnic lines because of the inter-ethnic competition that is going on over material opportunities. While some ethnic Uzbek businessmen apparently feel better able to gain a livelihood than they would in Uzbekistan, they also feel growing resentment toward the favoritism apparently shown to ethnic Kyrgyz, such as in receiving bank loans, government jobs, and political positions. Tending to live in the cities, the Uzbeks generally do better than most rural Kyrgyz. So Uzbek-Kyrgyz cleavages exist both within the cities and between the more Uzbek cities and the Kyrgyz rural areas. As many new mosques have been built after independence and religious practice has spread, these differences may be reinforced by the stronger influence of politicized forms of Islam among Uzbeks. Generally, the Kyrgyz are seen as less consistent practitioners of the faith, while some have stereotyped all Uzbeks as *Wahabis*, or practitioners of Saudi-style Islam.

Several socio-economic and cultural differences exist between these two ethnic groups, increasing the possibilities of tensions and perhaps violence. Other latent bases for political activity exist also, such as the north-south differences, rural-urban intra-Kyrgyz differences, and clan loyalties. Whether these would worsen the ethnic differences by intensifying competition over a shrinking economic pie in the south or might help to offset those differences, is unclear. The language differences between Russians and Kyrgyz are no longer a source of nationalistic tensions as they were in the early years of independence, however, due largely to the President's assertive efforts to maintain a multi-ethnic society.

Conflict Enabling or Accommodating Factors. In the coming years, if the economy does not improve, the persistence of these socio-economic problems could increasingly form the basis of political grievances and eventually take a violent form. In 1989, ethnic Uzbeks in the FV pushed for local autonomy from Moscow and annexation by the Uzbek Republic, but ethnic Uzbeks were given some representation in independent Kyrgyzstan parliament and government. In 1999 and 2000, the IMU was appealing for support from the ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan when they attempted to enter Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan from their bases in Tajikistan. Fortunately, though the Uzbeks might receive moral support from their ethnic brethren across the border and possibly some expressions of concern from the Uzbekistan government, there is no chance of an irredentist campaign. Were episodes to start getting out of hand, the two governments would likely work together to contain them, drawing on the generally good communications between the two presidents.

At the same time, however, shadow ethnic-based local civil defense networks might be growing in Kyrgyz Stan's FV mixed areas — perhaps as an 'insurance policy' on future political uncertainties. It also appears local police capacities could be insufficient to detect the use of covert force or deter spontaneous group violence. This leaves only crudely repressive means to contain local conflicts if they erupt, even though the police can probably keep such episodes from spreading. Although increased military spending is strengthening the weak army and security forces against armed insurgencies, the country's more mountainous terrain makes it difficult for them to maintain continuing surveillance and control over small groups that may carry out organized armed activity. Physically and economically marginalized areas such as Batken are simply less served by all forms of public services and authority.

Local administrative, judicial and security sector institutions are considerably more developed than in 1990, when spontaneous inter-ethnic violence broke out in Osh. The local *akim* exercise wide powers over the policies and politics of the oblasts. Local NGO's are sprouting up and assuming some public responsibilities, faster than in Uzbekistan. But the initial mushrooming of civic groups after independence was slowed by the economic crisis, and this sector is still very weak as an independent force in Kyrgyz politics. In principle, they seek to cut across the divisions in local communities, but individual organizations in the FV tend to be perceived as owned by Uzbeks or Kyrgyz, respectively. To make much headway against the dominant national and local patronage networks, civil society still faces major hurdles in receiving political, financial, regulatory, and cultural support.

In sum, many local communities and towns might lack sufficient governmental or civic capacities for engaging relevant actors in focused ways that can head off the eruption of local social problems into violence, address tensions when they first appear, and contain violence if it does arise. The problem for resisting potential conflicts in this country could be less the inflexibility or lack of legitimacy of government than the weaknesses of public institutions, especially in the rural areas.

The extent to which such institutions are put under stress will depend largely on whether the economy grows or declines. Kyrgyzstan has transitioned to a market economy much more quickly than Uzbekistan through privatization of industries, reducing state subsidies, and selling public lands to private farmers. It was the first Central Asia country to sign an IMF stand-by agreement and is the only one so far to join the

World Trade Organization (WTO). It has been eager to participate in many other international organizations. President Askar Akayev was not a former apparatchik when he assumed his post, but the post-Soviet collapse of trade and production was greater than in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan has been highly dependent on foreign assistance, and it now faces high inflation and a foreign debt that equals the GDP. The social safety net is being rationalized but is patchy. Overall, it is unclear whether Kyrgyzstan greater receptivity to economic reform and international influence will translate quickly enough into growth and jobs in its industrial, agricultural, or services sectors.

Whether violent conflict will eventually arise also depends on whether political institutions can accommodate varieties of opinion and co-opt dissent. At the national level, President Akayev, too, has amassed considerable power by appointing government officials, the heads of major enterprises, and judges and legislating through decrees. The earlier reputation that he had gained for promoting openness and pluralism has been tarnished over the years, particularly by the irregularities in the 2000 presidential elections, steps to increase presidential powers, and continuing corruption in the bureaucracies. Akayev seems to be shifting to a more gradualist approach to reform that resembles Karimov's. Although the highest court has issued decisions that diverged from the government's preference, the court system is seen as subject to political pressures.

Yet central government policymaking is less autocratic than in Uzbekistan. The Parliament and non-government political parties are not as manipulated as in Uzbekistan and potentially can exercise at least some veto power over national policy and executive excesses. Opposition groups, NGO's, and the international community have been able to exercise leverage over the President. But because the large numbers of parties are divided among themselves and they, too, have been manipulated, they are not seen as effective channels for representation or expressing grievances. Perhaps because of this, there is no mobilization of major ethnic or other interests into parties or other political organizations. The President does not control local power brokers, however, but has to negotiate with them. The Parliament has opposed the President's often bold economic reforms, and so he often seeks to circumvent them through plebiscites, such as the October 1998 referendum that passed the bill to support private land ownership. The regime is more tolerant of various religious persuasions although it watches the mosques closely. In short, the regime tolerates some opposition and does not repress so much it as try to keep it within bounds, but alternative views are simply weak and have been usually outmaneuvered.

Yet, there are positive trends in terms of building effective, responsive institutions. The still largely regime-oriented media could become more independent and develop a stronger voice that can stimulate some form of community leadership. Generational changes, the continued growth of SMEs, some possibilities for interest group politics, increasing access to increasingly sophisticated information technology, and more exposure of the people to the outside world may help to stimulate enough ingenuity to spur the economy and outweigh the negative trends.

The issue is again whether Kyrgyzstan economic policies, however reformist they may be compared to Uzbekistan's, will actually produce the goods. Opportunities for political participation are in principle greater than in Uzbekistan and in theory could both represent and 'buy off' any growing discontent because of the greater legitimacy of political processes. But the actual ability of the economy in Kyrgyzstan to produce basic needs is less in the short term.

Triggers and Restraints.

The announced retirement of the President in 2005 could stimulate infighting among the inner circles, because of the continued reliance on personal rule. But Kyrgyzstan may be better able than Uzbekistan to use elections as genuine vehicles for making political choices. But governmental and civic restraints on local violence or organized armed activity are weak.

Surkhondaryo Oblast in Southern Uzbekistan

The team also spent time in Denow, a city of about 100,000 in the northern area of the Surkhondaryo oblast, which is approximately 30 kilometers west of the Tajik border and 90 kilometers north of the Uzbek border with Afghanistan. Immediately to its east is Sariosiyo District, which begins at the Denow city limits and ends at the Tajik border.

Conclusions

Surkhondaryo has many economic and environmental problems that eventually could stimulate violence between ethnic groups and support local rebel movements if left unaddressed. Although outbreaks of inter-communal violence are quite possible, as yet there are no organized forces that could launch a serious security threat to the government. In the short and medium term, the Surkhondaryo area is the least likely of the three regions to erupt into significant, widespread violence.

Findings

Predisposing and Mitigating Structural Conditions. With essential resources scarce and a multi-ethnic population in competition for them, the latent sources of conflict are considerable in this area. Water is scarce for those involved in agriculture. Farmers living close to the Tajik border criticize the Tajik government for not allowing more water to pass into their farmlands, and competition for land resources is intense in this fertile valley. Denow and Sariosiyo are surrounded by mountains. Those living in mountainous areas (usually Tajiks) engage almost exclusively in livestock breeding rather than agriculture. Serious ecological pollution was caused by a now-closed chemical plant, a catastrophe that was not recognized by the government. Local citizens (sometimes not aware of the contamination) received no compensation from the government, and local authorities have not attempted to clean up the site.

For the past three years a serious drought has reduced crop harvests in the region. While in theory farms have been privatized, farmers are still required to fulfill government quotas on crops, such as cotton and wheat and are forced to sell these crops at below-market prices to the government.

During Soviet times, the region hosted wine-making, cotton gins and other factories, but the job market has suffered terribly from the closing of the few factories that existed in the region. Until recently, many residents of Surkhondaryo benefited from cross-border trade with Afghanistan and earned hard currency as construction contractors working for wealthy Afghans. But the level of economic activity has slowed because of security threats and regional politics. After the Taliban takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif and its environs in 1998, the Government of Uzbekistan closed its border with Afghanistan. The borders with Afghanistan and Tajikistan are now heavily mined. Scores of farmers and cattle herders have been either killed or injured by stepping on unmarked mines in Sariosiyo.

This region is remote from the capital. Aside from buses and private cars, there is little in the way of transportation linking residents of northern Surkhondaryo region to the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. Mountain passes and poorly constructed roadways make travel to Tashkent arduous and long. Authorities in Tashkent closed the Sariosiyo airports in the summer of 2000 after IMU attacks in the region. The airport is now used solely for military purposes. Flights are available daily from Termiz but they are expensive. Residents once traveled by train to Tashkent via Dushanbe, but these routes were suspended.

Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, is one and a half hours to the west, thus representing psychologically and economically a closer center of activity. But Sariosiyo's border with Tajikistan was closed in 1997.

Cars and buses may not travel across the border, and the closing of the border has seriously hampered cross-border trade. According to a mutual agreement between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, citizens inhabiting border areas do not require visas for travel. But residents complain that these regulations are not systematically implemented and that customs officials often elicit bribes for travel between the countries.

The area has also been marginalized by the central government. Southern Uzbekistan never received the kind of infrastructure and industrial development that other regions received during Soviet times, and since independence, according to many local residents, seems only to be of interest to the government as a source of potential Islamic fundamentalism. Because of the traditional and religious nature of those living in Denow/Sariosiyo, the government increasingly views this region with suspicion. There are no ministers in the Government of Uzbekistan who hail from Surkhondaryo region. The international donor assistance community has also largely ignored it.

The population of Denow is approximately 100,000. Although there are no published statistics, Uzbeks are estimated to make up 60 percent of Denow's population; while Tajiks compose 35 percent. This duality creates a potential for ethnic rivalry. Similarly, the Sariosiyo District boasts a population of 200,000, and the region is predominantly Tajik with Uzbeks comprising 20 percent of the population. In particular, a substantial rapid influx of refugees coming through the mountains into the Sariosiyo area of northeastern Surkhondaryo, where Uzbeks and Tajiks mingle, could upset the uneasy ethnic balance. Residents of the area note that many ethnic Uzbeks living in Tajikistan have moved to Denow and its environs since the beginning of the Tajik civil war. Most of these recent migrants compete for scare employment with native residents.

Conflict Enabling or Accommodating Factors. There are no universities or institutions of higher education in Denow, and university education is not accessible for most young people in the region. Uzbek-speaking students usually enter universities in Termiz, Samarkand, or Tashkent. However, there are two professional training schools in the city, a medical and a pedagogical college. Sariosiyo also has a newly built agricultural college. These colleges are not considered higher education in Uzbekistan but are a means for professional training. Students usually enter the colleges after 9th form at 16 years of age and graduate within four years. Thus, most young people who stay in the area finish school and seek to enter the job market. But the lack of job opportunities in the region has resulted in massive migration of young men seeking employment abroad either in Russia or Kazakhstan or in larger Uzbek cities such as Tashkent and Samarkand.

To advance educationally, Tajik speakers must learn Uzbek or forgo higher education in most instances. University education in the Tajik language is not offered regularly in Uzbekistan. Ad-hoc course offerings in the Tajik language are available in Samarkand and Termiz in only a limited number of departments. During the Soviet period, Tajik-speaking youth traveled to Dushanbe to earn university degrees, but the closing of the Tajik-Uzbek border now prevents such widespread travel between the two countries. Furthermore, Tajik diplomas are not considered to carry prestige and are not widely accepted in Uzbekistan. Since the Summer 2000 IMU incursions into Sariosiyo, the Government of Uzbekistan has cracked down on Tajik citizens, many of who are living illegally, and has deported them back to Tajikistan.

Perhaps favoring local harmony, there are no sharp religious differences in the area. Denow and Sariosiyo are populated almost exclusively by Sunni Muslims. The region is possibly more religious than the Ferghana Valley. The call to prayer can be heard regularly. Many women wear robes (*chopons*) to cover their heads. Denow and surrounding regions are one of the oldest settled communities in Central Asia, which translate into strong ties to religion and tradition.

Also, influential elites in Denow all know each other. They seem to share some pride in the area and have a common commitment to develop it, evincing a kind of Chamber of Commerce boosterism about the Uzbekistan government's policies. On the other hand, there seem to be few developed inter-ethnic channels in this conservative community for addressing latent issues that might be viewed as awkward.

The media in northern Surkhondaryo is heavily controlled by the government. Denow hosts a very weak private, non-governmental television station. The station broadcasts a 15-minute newscast twice a week on local affairs. There is one Uzbek language newspaper published by the Denow city administration. Russian television broadcasts (i.e. ORT, RTR, TV6) are not retransmitted into the region. Only national Uzbek television channels 1 and 2 are available. Due to the region's proximity to Tajikistan, local television and radio stations from Tursonzoda in the Tajik language are popular.

While there is the regular host of government organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) in Denow/Sariosiyo, there are only two truly non-governmental organizations. Both organizations have existed for less than one year. The first is an English language center in the village of Shargun in Sariosiyo District that provides English language training to students and English language teachers. The second NGO is a women's organization "Women and Youth" that provides legal literacy training to men and women in northern Surkhondaryo region. NGOs working in Surkhondaryo have complained about the rigidity of local government officials and believe that the city government has a poor understanding of the role of NGOs in civil society. In early 2001, the city mayor (unofficially) prohibited NGOs from carrying out training activities in the city, including those promoting gender equality. Although citizen cross-border dialogue programs have started concerning the contamination of the chemical plant, they have seen little response.

Triggers and Restraints. Since the Government of Uzbekistan's crackdown on 'Islamic Fundamentalism' in the mid-1990s hundreds of young men from this region have been arrested for participating in groups such as Hezb-i-Tahrir. While statistical evidence is impossible to verify, the number of those arrested in Denow/Sariosiyo is proportionately more significant than in other parts of Uzbekistan.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) attempted to enter the country via the mountains on the Tajik-Uzbek border at Sariosiyo in August 2000. The IMU incursions were met by a strong military offensive by the Uzbek Army. Tens of thousands of local villagers were displaced. These internally displaced people (IDPs) were housed in temporary camps organized by the army and other government authorities. In December, approximately 7,000 of the Sariosiyo IDPs were forcibly relocated to newly constructed camps in the southern region of Surkhondaryo in towns such as Sherobod.

Shortly after deportation to Sherobod, 73 young men, all ethnic Tajiks, were arrested by the government of Uzbekistan for allegedly collaborating with the IMU. The government insists these men, now known as the 'Sherobod 73' supplied food to the IMU and provided housing for their soldiers during their incursions into Uzbekistan. During their June 2001 trial, all of the 73 denied the charges. Nonetheless, they were uniformly sentenced to 17-year prison terms. The IDPs, who contend their villages never collaborated with the IMU, have all been relocated to camps in the desert far from their villages. They complain that they are not used to the desert climate and there is little drinking water. Tens of these IDPs have died since relocation due to illness. Their native villages in Sariosiyo are destroyed. The government claims this was the doing of the IMU, but the IDPs claim the Uzbek Army destroyed their villages.

PART III. REVIEW OF EXISTING USAID PROGRAMS

Assessing Development Impacts on Conflict and Peace

Part II identified major sources of potential violent conflicts and existing resources and capacities in the areas studied that are alleviating or helping to peacefully manage conflicts. The next task is to look at USAID Central Asia's current programs to see whether and how they address these factors. This exercise in turn is a prelude to making suggestions in Part IV on what seems especially effective in current programming and what might be improved.

How does one assess the relationship of a number of development programs and projects to conflict sources and/or peace capacities? This is a crucial question for policy evaluation and planning, and the field of conflict prevention is beginning to develop methodologies for judging the impacts of given development programs on factors reflecting the status of conflict and/or peace. Drawing on the analogy with environmental impact assessments, these methods are called 'peace and conflict impact assessment,' and essentially involve marrying the long-time methods of policy, program, and project evaluation to the newer subject matter of conflict and peace building.

There are at least three major ways in which existing programs and projects can be examined to determine whether they are affecting the sources of potential conflicts:

- Sectoral Goals. Do the social, economic, or other *goals* at which the assistance programs are aimed have some logical or substantive connection with conflict and peace factors that have been diagnosed as most important in determining the likelihood of violent conflicts? Are the programs and projects aiming at problems that correspond to those conflict/peace factors (i.e., by reducing the former or strengthening the latter)? Do they aim in the right directions? For example, do they seek to produce jobs to reduce unemployment? Their goals tend to be reflected in the sectoral focuses of a mission's portfolio.

- Points of Entry. A second way to assess whether programs and projects may affect conflict and peace looks at how their goals are pursued — i.e., how the problem they address is specifically approached. This gets at the *type of intervention* that is applied to the problem and its specific entry point into the manifestations and dynamics of that problem — i.e., how it seeks to get leverage. Who (or what) is addressed and what form of benefits or other kinds of influence is being applied to the problem? Different target groups might be children, university students, local politicians, cabinet-level policymakers, etc. Different objects of the assistance might be procedures, laws, organizational structures, individual or group attitudes, etc. Examples of differing types of influence would be training, educational materials, dialogues, financial assistance, in-kind benefits, etc.

- Observed Impacts. A third way in which assistance activities may be found to affect conflict and peace would look to see what *actual impacts* have been realized on the conflict and peace factors, directly or secondarily. This involves looking at specific projects in detail in terms of both how they are implemented and their outcomes, as measured by various explicit dimensions of conflict and peace (e.g., numbers of people removed from the threat of being killed, amount of communications across potentially conflicting groups that have been established, number of potentially tense disputes that have been resolved, etc.)

These three ways to assess an assistance activity — goals, modes of attack, and project implementation and outcomes — would be pursued by looking at different levels of aid operations, starting with USAID's own definition of its policy directions and then looking at the specific activities of implementing partners

it funds and their evident effects. Ideally, such a review should be done at all levels and for each of the differing geographic areas that are studied. But to take such a thorough approach to the relationship of current assistance to conflict and peace by looking at all these levels could easily take up an entire report.

For the present report, we can do a broad-brush analysis that provides useful insights on the first two questions and point toward ways a more comprehensive, in-depth peace and conflict evaluation might be carried out. The following pages derive from a rapid review of USAID and partners' programs as well as feedback from the mission on an earlier draft. They cover activities in all the areas studied as a whole, rather than individually, one by one.[6]

Portfolio Sectoral Goals

Which of the leading sources of potential conflict or peace capacities identified in Part II are addressed by existing USAID programs and their projects?[7] As seen in Table IIA, many of the identified sources of potential conflict and peace capacities are in fact being addressed through current USAID programs and projects. These include socio-economic "structural" factors, such as seen in SME loan promotion and water systems development, as well as institutional-political factors, such as training for civil servants. Through its partners, USAID is not only addressing some of the fundamental concerns of the society that vitally touch the core of many people's lives, but in the process is helping to reduce the potential for these issues to reach levels of tension or violence.

It could be said that the programs contribute a safety valve by creating skills for seeking redress of the grievances and improving the administrative apparatuses that affect various everyday problems of many citizens. Failing to take such actions over time could lead to a build-up of resentment and frustration that eventually might generate violent actions or an organized armed rebellion. We can infer from such a rapid mapping and matching exercise that the programs are definitely contributing in some degree toward reducing sources of potential conflicts and enhancing capacities for handling tensions non-violently.[8]

Table III A.
Identified Sources of Conflict and Peace Addressed
by Goals of Current USAID CAR Mission Programs

Diagnosed Sources of Conflict or Peace Capacities	Goals of Existing USAID-Supported Programs and Projects
Land scarcity	Land reform education and training assistance to farmers
Lack of water for crops and drinking	Community water projects Community irrigation management training, equipment, information Inter-governmental water negotiations facilitation
Unemployment and need for jobs	Micro-credit SME development Business and economics education and curricula in universities Business investment
Ethnic relations and cooperation	Community conflict resolution training
Insensitive, politically influenced administrative and judicial decision making	Legal clinics Promotion of legal associations Legal advice for women
Inefficient public administration	Technical advice on tax administration, pensions reform

Weak parliaments	Technical advice to parliaments on laws regarding small business, banking, etc.
Lack of effective interest groups	Grants, training, technical assistance to support NGO formation and management Civic education
Lack of information on public affairs issues	Support to independent media outlets and program
Inefficient macro-economic policies	Technical advice on fiscal reform, banking policy

The exercise also helps to highlight conflict and peace factors diagnosed that do not currently appear to be addressed, at least directly. These include population density, youth aspirations and attitudes, families with low incomes, religious differences, the gray market, border controls, poor government data, recruitment and funding of armed activity, and government practices in repressing perceived opposition groups. It is also noteworthy that some goals that are presently addressed did not show up among the leading sources of potential conflict. These include: training in health care sector management and marketization, HIV/AIDS reduction, and infectious diseases control.[9]

Points of Entry

In terms of *how* individual programs and projects seek to obtain leverage on a problem area, although the project budgets and operations were not surveyed, it appears that many seek to influence the 'software' of society and politics such as through skills training, information dissemination, shaping educational content, and encouraging interactive processes such as dialogue. Less activity seems to be directed at supplying 'hardware' such as financial support, equipment, transport, technology, and buildings. Many of the projects work through non-state actors and organizations at the local rayon or mahalla level, but some operate at the national level in relation to actors within the central government.

In particular, many seek to reduce various socio-economic needs of individuals or families (e.g., poor housing conditions) through empowering them to take more informed, effective action vis-à-vis local government authorities (e.g., through apprizing women of their legal rights or media public service announcements). Through the aggregate effect of the contacts and actions taken by these people on their own behalf or by other advocates, the intent is to make administrative institutions themselves more professional and responsive. An example is informing farmers of their rights under the new Kyrgyzstan land reform law so that their self-advocacy will lead to more knowledgeable and rule-governed implementation of the legislation by the local authorities and thus more land distribution. Similar system reform goals are being pursued in the health care sector. Benefits are expected in building not only individual, family, and small group capacity, but also organizational and institutional capacities (e.g., schools).

PART IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

We turn to more specific recommendations that flow from the preceding conflict diagnosis and program review.

USAID Programs and Processes

The suggestions below parallel the levels of decision making that were distinguished above where choices can be made by USAID or its implementing partners:

- Above the level of individual projects (overall goals, strategy development, and sectoral priorities)
- Individual project approaches, including within projects and cross-project linkages.

We also briefly address USAID's relations to other parts of the US government and other donors.

Overall Goals and Strategy Development

Both of these post-independence countries face immense challenges in state-building and economic and political reform, while working with relatively few resources in a rapidly globalizing and economically competitive world. These challenges are generating serious tensions between winners and losers who are being affected differently by the new ways in which basic economic needs as well as new opportunities are being allocated.

Accordingly, it is useful for USAID to think of its overall task as not simply that of promoting democratization, economic reform, or adherence to human rights as discrete objectives in themselves, without factoring in how their pursuit may affect possible violent conflicts and the management of tensions through peaceful means. Depending on how these goals are achieved, the resulting social and political change can alter the prospects for violence prevention and peaceful management of conflict. Thus the overriding goal should be that of fostering a *peaceful process of transition* toward these various goals.

Conflict Analytical Capacity For Strategy Development. For USAID and its partners to carry out an effective conflict prevention program in the Ferghana Valley and elsewhere in Central Asia, USAID and its partners should set up a ongoing system, which could continually monitor the impacts on conflict and peace building of local, national and regional developments as well as US and other policies. That monitoring process could then be used as a basis for guiding policy practice at several levels where choices are made. Since it is not clear where precise hot spots or crises points may develop, early warning systems would help to track potential conflict areas across the Central Asian region and appropriate flexibility could be built in to deploy USAID's resources for conflict prevention responses in terms of their geographic area foci, sectoral emphasis, and methods of attack.

If USAID and its partners begin to sense that tensions are starting to build in a particular community or set of communities, for example, then USAID could canvass partners working in other sectors to see whether they could contribute resources to dampen down the potential for violent conflict. This might take the form of relatively low cost interventions such as studies, polls, surveys, round table seminars, television materials, short-term local or international dispute resolution specialists, as well as possible physical infrastructure activities (roads, bridges, dams, wells, canals, schools, etc) that could be put into place to help to defuse looming conflicts. Thus, this part of USAID's conflict prevention program would be set up like a 'volunteer fire department,' or a rapid response unit — except that it goes to the scene of *potential* political fires.

Such an adaptive capacity requires sound analysis. Identifying those areas that show the highest potential for violent conflict can draw on expertise that has developed and apply grounded conflict assessment tools. Frameworks based on empirical research are needed to guide the political and analytical capacity that already exists in the region and to structure the process of collecting information and data. As one data collection tool that can feed the strategy process, the Mission could continue to conduct annual polling exercises in each country but add appropriately-worded conflict-sensitive questions that aim to help both USAID and US embassies keep a finger on the political pulse of the Ferghana Valley and other potential hotspots. Generally, such polling should be carried on a bilateral basis within a given country. Some of it might occasionally be done in a parallel fashion in two or more countries to give the net effect of regional coverage, depending on the questions that need to be asked at any particular time.

This conflict prevention capacity also requires a decision making process for adopting appropriate and feasible geographic area and project responses. This could be done by establishing a Partners' Steering

Committee to provide substantive guidance and coordination. Any coordination mechanisms that USAID puts into place should be for the convenience of USAID. Because the conditions in each country share some similarities but differ nationally and locally especially in the details, it is important that USAID's prevention response be operated as a series of tandem country-specific programs, not as a regional program. USAID and its various partners work bilaterally in each of the countries of the CAR under the US Government's bilateral accord with individual governments. It is important for USAID to operate below the inter-governmental level in its conflict work, in order to avoid the sovereignty issues that appear to have plagued the UN's initial Ferghana Valley initiative. Appendix C and Figure C sketch out one possible organizational structure for such a process.

Sectoral Priorities

During this difficult transition period, a development strategy needs to consider where and how balances should be struck between:

1. Alleviating some of the underlying material distress that intensifies the competition between social groups, by "enlarging the pie,"

2. Strengthening the process and institutions that can manage the deprivations and conflicts of transition in a generally non-violent way, and

3. Heading off specific threats to stability and sources of violence, whether material conditions worsen or improve.

Regarding the first category, the portfolio has a mix of interventions involving service provision, social mobilization that targets particular institutions, and institutional capacity-building. In view of the longer term threats to national stability arising from social and economic stress that were uncovered in Part II, consideration might be given to adding additional resources to conflict-sensitive projects that deal with:

- Youth
- Local drug markets and use
- Secondary and vocational education

The portfolio also recognizes that while deep-seated structural so-called root causes of conflict in these two countries need to be addressed through job creation, these needs are not going to diminish for some time. Therefore, in the meantime, the societies need to be better prepared to handle the emerging tensions procedurally and behaviorally.

In this respect, the relatively heavy emphasis on local community mobilization and civil society should be complemented by giving more attention to the governing, administrative, and political infrastructures and processes at the national and central government level. These actors and institutions vitally shape these societies' and economies' national policies and thus the overall distribution of resources. In the coming years, formal political processes and institutions that can forge compromises between competing interests will be crucial in deciding whether the arena of national politics becomes polarized or contributes to determining the public interest. Such mainstream institutions will continue to make the key choices that affect the socio-economic status of social groups and thus determine the groups' responses to their treatment by the state.

The portfolio also includes some interventions at the diplomatic and leadership levels, which target top or middle-level leaders and their decision-making and behavior. Additional, highly selective initiatives might be considered to reach members of the political and policy elite, thus taking the central governments at their word that they are committed to gradual economic reform and political

liberalization. The current events that have fostered closer relations around common concerns such as terrorism and drug trafficking may afford more openings and opportunities to initiate additional forms of informal track-two, 'constructive engagement.' Such informal dialogue has been carried out in Tajikistan around the peace process, but it could be tried in potential conflict situations with regard to transition policy issues. These discussions could be conducted informally on difficult public policy issues such as corruption or monetary policy — even if the participants are only nominally receptive to such discussions.

This focus would represent a return to the classic supply-driven' approach that international assistance agencies traditionally have used to promote policy reforms by providing support to government policy-makers to help them to undertake better analysis and policymaking. Although the expectation has been that this will lead to the design of better policies, the aim in the present instance should be the more modest one of creating relationships and opening minds to new options and approaches, even though the policymaking environment at the top is highly political.

Relatively more attention might be paid to more immediate potential violence-triggering factors, such as tactics police might use when faced with tensions in a crowd. This might spell the difference between a peaceful demonstration and a deadly ethnic riot. The weakness of an illegitimate security force might allow an increasingly violent and authoritarian public life to go unchecked, even if development problems ease. However, appropriately trained police might thwart some of the mobilization of violent or armed activity. Thus, the mission might explore ways it might help to support security sector personnel through training programs, so that conflict resolution and democratic values and principles are fostered within police agencies.

Cross-Project Linkages

USAID needs to find ways to cross-link various partners' programs in a more strategic manner. The Steering Committee for USAID's Ferghana Valley program together with USAID itself should take a more proactive and conflict-sensitive approach to the deployment of partner's resources. Within individual projects, for example, a recent analysis suggests that more attention needs to be paid to the ethnic composition of the staff.[10] The purpose is to model inter-ethnic cooperation and to avoid negative impressions in areas where different competing ethnic groups are settled. But across projects, a community or an area that is designated to be a hotspot should receive cross-linked assistance from a number of USAID partner organizations so as to concentrate the effort and achieve a multiplier effect. The Steering Committee, plus USAID management should be responsible for coordinating and overseeing such cross-linkages.

Technical Working Groups. As part of this effort to use partner resources more effectively in the Ferghana Valley, USAID should explore the utility of creating thematic or sectoral working groups to address issues such as water, or employment, or public health. Various partners work with different facets of these sectors.[11] Technical working groups, operating internally under USAID auspices or externally with other parties could bring various perspectives together and seek common solutions, particularly as this relates to conflict. Sometimes cross-sectoral working groups — for example land and water — might also prove helpful. USAID's individual programs are almost all multifaceted. Many of the partners' projects and programs are also closely interlinked. Water relates to agriculture, for example, which relates to land tenure, which relate to micro credit, which relates to legal systems. However, the public policy choices involved with these various program activities are not being fully addressed through USAID's existing support mechanisms.

The inter-state technical working groups and negotiations process could be well served by more efforts to develop parallel NGO civil society discussion mechanisms. The existing agreements and negotiation mechanisms need to be further buttressed to continue to build confidence. More regularized dispute

procedures involving technical experts over time will avoid the damage that the repeated politicized ad hoc water disputes will otherwise could have in weakening the handling of regional inter-state issues. Unless more confidence building occurs in technical policy issue areas such as drugs, border issues, or corruption, then continued national deterioration could lead to inter-state conflicts.

Social Marketing. USAID in Central Asia is familiar with using Madison Avenue techniques to help to 'sell' socially useful products, such as birth control devices. Similar social marketing techniques could be applied to other more abstract USAID-funded programs,[12] in order to increase the effectiveness of such program's outreach techniques. If necessary, USAID partners should be encouraged to buy air time to help to market their messages to a broader public.[13] USAID itself carries out some marketing efforts to ensure that stakeholders know about its programs. Individual partner's programs publicize meetings and activities they sponsor. Some partners go further and prepare public service announcements (PSAs) dealing with important issues such as land reform. Some partners conduct their own marketing as part of a branding exercise to publicize their names and increase their own levels of visibility. Polls also help to inform and shape USAID's larger public outreach and media strategies. When appropriate, data from individual polls or surveys could be publicized to the extent feasible and acceptable to host country governments. These activities represent an important step towards a more comprehensive communications strategy, but they don't appear to go far enough.

Creating "Public Space" for Policy Dialogue and Civic Education. In the US, the press helps in important ways to carry out the function of airing different perspectives on policy issues. Groups like National Public Radio and Public Television's News Hour, as well as many commercial stations and the printed press, routinely put together programs or packages that give voice to a wide variety of competing ideas. Talking heads on the talk shows and Op Ed pieces in the newspapers are other examples. Through these vehicles, ideas receive wide media coverage in the market place for ideas, and various public policy options are discussed and debated, both formally and informally. Eventually such ideas might make their way to policy makers in the legislatures and executive branches of government. After further formal debates in Congress and state legislatures across the country, laws eventually are passed and administrative regulations are promulgated.

Using the Media. The people of Central Asia need help in learning how to participate in this type of constructive conflict in the marketplace for ideas. Currently, the media of Central Asia are not well equipped to provide appropriate coverage of important public policy choices facing citizens and countries. But several media avenues exist to carry out public awareness and public information campaigns. Notional figures in the table below show that currently there are about 90 independent television stations, for example, with the potential to reach approximately half the population of Central Asia. Central Asian journalists for their part are still learning how to become journalists in the way we use the term in the United States or Western Europe. They are still learning how to conduct interviews that elicit a range of opinions and perspectives. There is limited capacity within Central Asia to prepare documentaries, or other journalistic products that present a wide range of opinions, and suggest a range of possible solutions to individual public policy issues.

Table IV A.

Independent TV Stations, with Estimated Audience(s)

Country	Number of Independent Television Stations	Estimated Audience(s)
Kazakhstan	35	5 – 8 mil
Uzbekistan	20	15 mil
Kyrgyzstan	15 - 19	2 – 2.5 mil
	20	2 – 2.5 mil
Turkmenistan	0	0
Totals	90 - 94	24 – 28 mil

USAID could do more to prepare, publicize, and disseminate messages about the substantive content of its partners' programs to a larger audience across Central Asia through independent media and other ways that can promote meaningful public dialogue. For this, mechanisms are needed within the USAID portfolio to identify and publicize a wide range of important public policy choices, process information about these choices, and package such materials into documentaries or other public outreach materials that could reach the millions of people watching independent television across Central Asia. One of the best and most cost effective approaches that USAID could initiate over the next couple of years would encourage more open and explicit public dialogue about important social, and economic trends and development strategies. This approach does not simply publicize the substance and content of a specific partner's project but helps to dramatize important public policy issues using a variety of outreach and public education techniques. These might include television documentaries, televised debates between advocates of different strategies and perspectives, television talk shows, panel discussions, seminars, soap operas, drama troops, or even subsidized commercial films.[14] This material could also be put into the classroom and used in teacher training programs.

Individual partners should continue to do more of this public outreach and education. But some of it could come from linking partners more closely with organizations like Internews. In the short and near-medium term, enhanced coverage of partners' programs could come from providing additional resources to Internews, to permit them to expand their programs and activities to promote the idea of 'constructive conflict' using independent media across Central Asia. Beyond Internews, USAID should consider funding an internationally credentialed communications group, to help prepare documentaries and other public information packages that describe the sectoral issues addressed by the activities of AID's partners.[15] Such materials could be put into the form of half hour television documentaries, for example, that would discuss what was happening with important issues like water from a variety of public policy perspectives.

Similar programs could be prepared for issues like private housing and the role of cooperatives or condominiums, the role of small and medium enterprise, and how it is changing people's lives, or the role of suitcase traders. Other programs could be considered for different types of education. What kinds of education work best? What is less successful? Where are market mechanisms taking health care in Central Asia? What is happening with environmental issues? What are the economic costs to overly rigid border formalities in the Ferghana Valley? An intensive program that addresses such public policy issues could help open up space in terms of an enlarged public dialogue about the future. USAID thus could begin to support the creation of a holding environment, where people learn that it is okay to discuss such matters in public. Over time this expanded holding environment could become an important safety valve, supporting conflict prevention efforts by creating alternative venues for discussion, and dispute resolution.

This may involve issuing a new RFP, and bringing in a new contractor with an explicit mandate to help broaden public dialogue about important public policy issues. Such dialogue is one mechanism for

helping to prevent violent conflict. It models important behavior, where the conflict becomes focused on the conflict of ideas in an appropriate holding environment like a TV studio or in the printed press. It may prove necessary to bring in one or more additional contractors with a specific mandate to work closely with existing partners and other stakeholders in order to put together packages of substantive materials describing the content of their programs for presentation to independent media channels. In this way, the substance behind partners' programs could be put in the public arena.[16]

Promoting Interest Group Politics. Civic associations, together with trade and professional associations are a common feature in the United States and Western Europe. While the American and Western European public understand the role of such groups, their role is not commonly understood in former communist countries, particularly in Central Asia. USAID and its partners are supporting the development of interest groups, which are beginning to lobby for their special interests. These groups are still relatively fragile, with weak voices. They have a long way to go before they can lobby effectively, and even further before they can form coalitions of interest groups that will put meaningful pressures on political systems. Most associations in Central Asia still have a weak membership base, for example, with limited experience lobbying on behalf of their members' interests.

For more than 10 years, USAID has been investing resources to develop programs that can support such political change.[17] The tools include strategic management, strategic planning, stakeholder analysis, policy analysis, competitiveness exercises, and political mapping. Many of these tools are directly relevant to the interest groups with which USAID's partners are working in Central Asia. Using such techniques can help develop positive working relationships among institutions and support the move towards a transparent, market-led society. Policy change often involves such things as advocacy strengthening for business associations; policy coordination and communications for government agencies or ministries; constituency building for legislative bodies; membership development for civic groups; and media strategies for public and private sector organizations.

This approach draws upon the economic principle that public policy 'supply' will emerge in response to effective 'demand,' so it supports the strengthening of private sector and civil society capacities to generate and lobby for policy reforms. To insert themselves effectively into the policy process, private sector interest groups need to identify their interests, and organize themselves to make demands on government, as well as developing sufficient voice to be able to articulate their own proposed solutions. To become effective participants in the policy reform proves, such interest groups need capacities to:

- Clarify and develop consensus on the policy issues that affect them;
- Develop constituencies and coalitions for policy reforms, and understand their requirements and complexities;
- Plan and take appropriate practical advocacy steps; and
- Review and monitor actions taken to support their plans.

For the next three or four years, USAID/CAR could focus on strengthening individual interest groups that can develop vested interests in mitigating conflicts. Such interest groups typically represent important building blocks for a civil society.[18] They include small and medium enterprise owners, and employees, private farmers' associations (including cooperatives), water user's associations, members of condominium associations, the NGO community, selected academic groups, journalists associations linked with independent media, etc. Over the next three to five years, these groups will need help to articulate their own self-interests. As they become more proficient in this process, they could become part of an emerging system of checks and balances within individual countries, where one interest group helps to check the interests of another. Over time such groups should take a growing role in the on-going public dialogue about the future of the region. How should land be owned, for example? How should

water be distributed? What is the appropriate role for the citizen? What are the rights of a citizen? For USAID and its partners, expanding work with independent media may represent one way to help these individual interest groups to find their own voices.

Giving voice to members of these interest groups represents part of a strategy to grow a "peace building constituency" that together with the governments promotes progressive cumulative evolutionary change, instead of deterioration into eventual violent conflict. Strengthening such interest groups will also help to prevent the potential polarization of political life between governments on the one hand and militant political Islam on the other. Independent media might become part of the glue that gives a stronger identity to such interest groups. Over time, the independent media might be part of a strategy that helps to link such interest groups into broader coalitions.

Building Coalitions. Some of USAID's current partners in Central Asia could become potential members of a Coalition for Change (or perhaps less threateningly, Coalitions for National Development). Over the next four or five years, the interest groups with which USAID's partners work — water users associations, small and medium enterprises, condominium associations, etc — need encouragement and support. After a few years some of these individual interest groups may begin to form broader coalitions sharing common interests. Such a process will take several years before such coalitions start to achieve critical mass. Eventually, however, such interest groups could start to work together to overcome the entrenched interests of political elites who currently control large parts of the administrative apparatus and the economies of the countries of the region. USAID and the people of Central Asia are beginning to plant the seeds for such advances. USAID should become more systematic in supporting such broader political progress.

An Integrated USAID Program to Manage Transition

Looked at together, the ideas described above suggest a program with interlocking components that exert leverage at several levels simultaneously. These include:

- An analytical and research capacity, which would look at important conflict variables such as class, clans, the economics of interest groups, etc, and carry out analytical and political mapping exercises;
- Polling and survey research;
- A communications component to deliver stimulating messages to interested audiences across Central Asia about the policy issues that are facing their communities and governments; and
- A capacity to strengthen interest groups, and eventually over time, support the formation of coalitions of interest groups to influence policies and effect broader structural and political changes.

This package of activities represents a vision for stabilizing Central Asian states by addressing the several short and medium-term causes of violent conflict while promoting political dynamism that is constructive not confrontational. Appendix D shows a schematic version of how the ideas sketched out in this paper might be organized to reinforce one another under one umbrella program. Local firms could undertake many activities. USAID could bring in one or more institutional contractors to manage the overall process.

USAID Relations with Other USG Agencies

An effective program to achieve peaceful transitions cannot be achieved by USAID and its partners alone. While USAID rightly is seeing the prevention of violent conflicts as a central concern, conflict prevention

cannot be left exclusively to the development and humanitarian instruments that operate primarily within countries and have been applied to a great extent in relation to their civil societies. As other analyses have argued,[19] conflict prevention must also be implemented through US inter-state diplomacy as well as military relations. The success of this strategy should build on the amicable relations that exist between the USAID missions and the embassies in the two countries.

In particular, the closer relations that are being established for strategic reasons between the US armed forces and the two governments should be used as a vehicle for creating more contact between these governments on a range of domestic and inter-state issues affecting the region's stability and development. The global emphasis on combating terrorism is throwing more weight behind security efforts in the narrow, technical sense, but such measures need to be kept in balance with the overall tasks of building legitimate state institutions that observe human rights. In view of the heightened visibility that each country will receive due to the presence of new international missions, an opening exists to promote the policy goals that are needed to ensure conflict prevention and peace building within these countries. But this opportunity must be seized. We recommend that USAID take deliberate steps to engage the other US agencies in discussing the specifics of a conflict prevention and peace building strategy for the Central Asian countries.

USAID Relations with Other Donors and Multi-lateral Organizations

Similarly, no single donor can expect to exert great leverage on the multiple sources of possible emerging conflicts, for recipient countries are often skilled at playing different donors off one another to avoid tough decisions. Thus, the most cost-effective way to implement one's own programs is to seek ways in which they can be reinforced and complemented by those of other actors to achieve maximum impact. In Central Asia, the Swiss, German and Dutch development agencies are active in peace-building programs, and the UN, OSCE, ADB, World Bank, IMF, and NATO are significant multilateral actors. Thus, USAID should build into its normal programming procedures specific points at which it consults with these other actors regarding the situation and the resources they collectively can bring to bear on it. Indeed, the US may be one of the most persuasive actors in encouraging joint analysis of the region's development and conflict problems.

One such process for joint analysis and response that USAID might participate in already exists in each country under the auspices of the UN Common Country Assessments (CCA) and Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This process reviews each country's status and progress in relation to indicators that each country has made under the international agreements it has signed. Similarly, steps might be taken to consider how the various OSCE principles that all states in the region have signed onto, can be used as a normative framework or 'code' to assess each country's policy programs. To focus attention on country performance, national committees, and eventually a regional coalition of civil society groups, might form Helsinki-type committees, which issue periodic reports that focus on human rights, military spending, confidence building measures, economic vitalization, democracy, and other OSCE inter-state and intra-state concerns.[20] Working under such multilateral umbrellas could be useful to avoid turning Central Asia into an arena for debilitating rivalry among the West, Russia, China, and other powers in a new 'Great Game' that could increase inter-state and thus intra-state tensions.

APPENDIX A - ILLUSTRATIVE QUESTIONS ADDRESSED

Regarding Potential Flashpoints in Ferghana Valley and Southern Uzbekistan

Below are illustrative analytical questions derived from syntheses of the empirical research on the leading causes of contemporary violent conflicts. They were used as a "checklist" to be examined in the Central Asian context, along with other region- and country-specific questions and others that arise as the investigation proceeds. These generic questions are a starting point for identifying leading ingredients of each potential flashpoint, their probability of breaking out into violence, criteria for assessing existing programs in relation to the conflicts, and promising entry points for USAID programs.

I. Defining Features of the Conflict

A. Actors: Who are main protagonists and indirect stakeholders involved in these conflicts, their subgroups, the constituencies on which they do or can draw support, and their patrimonial or other modes of influence with these constituencies. What is the comparative power of these parties socially, politically, and militarily?

B. Issues and positions. What policy, political, legal, etc. issues are overtly or latently at stake for the interests of potential parties? What open positions are parties taking on issues?

C. Scope and intensity. Within what geographic area and political arena is the conflict waged? How has the level of tension or violence fluctuated over recent years?[1]

II. Risk Factors

What conditions are contributing in the long-term and short term toward possible or escalating actual collective violence or armed conflict.[2] Whether problems and issues escalate into violence in a particular situation depends on a number of local and external ingredients combining situationally. These may originate internally, from neighboring states, or outside the region.

A. Structural Factors are underlying economic and social conditions that can provide fertile ground for the emergence of violence or armed activity between organized or unorganized groups within or outside governments.

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[1] A conflict may move through inter-party relationships and levels of hostility such as:

- Latent conflict, with ongoing communication and interaction among groups in society with differing interests
- Emergence of tensions and signs of emerging divisions
- Unstable peace, involving increasing polarization and intensification of tensions, acts of low-level violence
- Crisis: high tensions, disengagement, confrontation, and escalating violence
- War: continuing use of organized violence or armed forces
- Stalemate of violence/armed force
- De-escalation or cessation of violent conflict
- Negotiations of a settlement, accords
- Settlement implementation
- Post-settlement reconstruction and reconciliation

[2] Though conflict is inherent in society and can be healthy if peaceful, "conflict" is used hereafter to mean destructive/violent conflict (actual or potential), not to political conflict that may be constructive.

1. Competing socio-economic needs and interests: Where and to what extent does competition exist over scarce essential land, water, or other valued natural resources; shelter; education; jobs; and other income or wealth resources or future opportunities? What is the distribution of these vital resources among major groups that could be parties to potential conflicts?

2. Society's composition and inter-communal relations: How many major ethnic or other identity groups compete over these vital assets? To what extent do they differ in multiple societal and cultural respects such as language, religion, location, livelihood, income and other features? How does this affect their rank and files' everyday contact and interactions – such as reflected in social and cultural practices and institutions -- and the suspicions or hostility expressed in inter-group attitudes and perceptions? Do these groups have significant "kin-group" supporters in neighbor states?

3. Past conflicts. Have these groups engaged in violent conflict with or coercion of each other in the past?

B. Political-institutional factors are intermediary structures, organizations, processes, and communication channels, including government policies, that activate and can exacerbate the conflicts between interests over structural conditions, by determining whether and how they are expressed, politicized, organized, responded to, or suppressed.

1. Identity group political mobilization: To what extent are major societal groups highly conscious of their respective identities? To what extent have they organized themselves concretely into exclusive cultural, social and political organizations, such as political movements or parties that articulate the groups' interests and grievances (e.g., Islamist movements, ethnic-based and nationalist political parties, aristocratic ideologies) and press for them collectively through political action, including coercive or violent action? To what extent and from what sources have these groups accumulated funding, arms, leadership skills, and technical means needed to advance their interests, such as through coercive and violent methods? Where are their financial and political sources of support (e.g. neighbor states, diasporas, drug trafficking or other illegal activity)?

2. Governing institutions and processes: What kinds of governance and institutions have been inherited from the recent past? What organized interests drive the decision making of the formal governing institutions and processes and the allocation of public policy benefits at local and national levels? To what extent are executive policy and decision making bodies, bureaucracies, and other agencies of the state, including security forces, restricted to one or more politically mobilized identity groups, or captured and divided up between differing interests? Do dominant government structures permit some decision making participation by major groups simultaneously (power-sharing)? *(III C 2)*[3]

3. Political leaders' interactions: To what extent are powerful public officials, the leaders coming from major competing identity communities, and/or economic and political elites acting unilaterally and contentiously toward each other, not engaged in any political dialogues or negotiations about important policy/political issues, or stalemated in such policymaking?

4. International integration: Do the countries and societies in question have limited diplomatic and economic regional and global ties? How engaged in the course of domestic policy affairs are international bodies offering significant specific incentives and opportunities?

[3] The numbers indicate bullets in SOW Section III, pages 5 and 6.

C. Triggers are events or immediate acts that are said or done, especially by people who are in a position to influence the course of events in specific crisis situations, such as overtly hostile or violent actions and incendiary public rhetoric that can spark violent expressions of the deeper risk factors.

1. Leaders' mindsets, political ideologies and rhetoric: To what extent are distrustful attitudes, perceptions, fears, etc. held by key individual leaders and their immediate circles about their opponents being expressed that antagonize other groups? Are incumbent leaders on at least one side of political conflicts insecure and thus accentuating existing social divisions through provocative statements and policies?

2. Coercive and violent behavior: What specific violent public acts, speech, gestures, and collective events are perpetuating or escalating the conflict?

III. Conflict Regulating or Inhibiting Factors and Peace Building Capacities

To assess the potential for violent conflict, assessment also needs to be made of capacities that exist for peaceful management or reduction of potential or actual conflicts. These restraining factors can be classified like those factors above as underlying structural, political-institutional, and behavioral factors, except that they might countervail those forces by preventing violence from erupting or significantly escalation. For example:

- To what extent do viable local community institutions, such as interest associations across societies or borders, markets such as trade and commercial relations, and national governing institutions and procedures encompass differing identity groups?

- What informal institutions and processes already mediate or adjudicate societal conflicts and political disputes in ways that promote peaceful resolution?

- Do governing bodies engage "top-level" official political in ongoing rule-governed negotiations and decision making in order to transact common public business? In situations of actual or imminent violence among groups of people do leaders express conciliatory statements and accommodating policy actions?

- What are the current capacities of police and army forces to deter and squelch initial outbreaks of violent conflict or rebellions, at least in the short term?

IV. Potential for Outbreak

In view of the factors assessed above, how likely is this conflict to break out in significant violence or armed force and destabilize the area (III C 1)?

APPENDIX B - DRUG TRAFFICKING PROSPECTS

The future prospects of drug trafficking deserves attention not only because the earnings from drug production and sales can help to support insurgencies or regional warlords, but also because it continues to be a serious threat to political stability in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries in two other ways. The corruption and insecurity it causes can undermine the legitimacy of government, and in the longer term, the increasing local use of drugs could increase the cases of addiction and HIV/AIDS. Though up to now the latter have been relatively small problems, their increase could corrode society and absorb scarce state revenues for drug enforcement and treatment programs. We focus here mainly on the first two effects.

No clear consensus exists on the exact extent to which the drug trade helped to finance the IMU and was at the heart of its operations. On the one hand, Uzbek government officials claim that the IMU obtained funds from drug trafficking and that their recent incursion in Surkhondarya was in fact launched to protect drug trade routes. Kyrgyz officials have also stated the IMU's main aim is drug distribution, and that it has helped its patron, Osama bin Laden, to control the path to drug markets. International observers such as Jane's Intelligence Weekly agree that the IMU has tried to secure drug routes. But other analysts think the IMU has received more of its funding from Osama bin Laden directly than from drug trafficking, and that the incursions have other motives, so that the drug trade is relatively less essential.

In any case, whether drug trafficking will continue to serve as a source of some financing to IMU remnants or some successor insurgency organization, depends on whether drug production and trafficking itself continues to operate significantly through Central Asia. This, too, has become more uncertain as a result of the US military campaign in Afghanistan. In particular, it seems to hinge on whether the post-Taliban interim government and its successors can effectively reduce poppy cultivation.[21]

During the 1990's, the sources of opium globally became concentrated in a small number of countries. Afghanistan's portion of global production rose dramatically, and by 1999, it was the world's chief supplier, responsible for 75 percent of the world's opium production. The chain that stretches from the growing of poppies to the taking of heroin by the drug users in Western countries starts at the one end with the Afghan farmers who plant poppy seeds each spring and fall. They sell the harvested opium liquid that the poppy plants secrete to small processors, who turn the raw opium into a morphine base and then heroin. Because Iran, Pakistan and Turkey have clamped down in recent years on processing activities and improved their border controls, the small processors increasingly set up shop in Afghanistan. Many of them have been located in northern Afghanistan in order to be as close as possible to its borders with the countries of Central Asia, which currently offer the easiest export routes to the opium exporters and traders to whom the processors sell.

Although the Taliban imposed harsh punishments on users of harmful drugs, they allowed more and more opium production during their tenure. They argued that in a country with such a dry climate and little arable land, poor Afghan farmers depend on this crop for some improvement in their meager income. But the Taliban government also received tax revenue from the growers (10 percent) and the processors and traders (20 percent), which was estimated to total between $10 million and $50 million per year. However, even before this problem received attention as a result of the events of September 11 events, the Taliban were making efforts to curtail opium production. A failed ban in 1997 of one-third of current production instead saw a significant surge in opium production to over 4,000 tons. But under further international pressure, Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban head, issued a more extensive ban on opium production in July 2000. To the surprise of the international community, this ban apparently virtually wiped out opium production in most Taliban parts of Afghanistan. Because this then included 90

percent of the country, the ban caused massive hardship for Afghan farmers. Drought also contributed to the decline.

However, drug flows out of the country continued at a steady level in 2001, because of previous stockpiles. Observers suspect the Taliban also conserved considerable amounts in order to keep the price of heroin up. Also, some of the production areas were outside Taliban control. Nevertheless, in the spring of 2001, US plans were afoot to respond to the ban by helping to fund alternative income schemes for Afghan farmers.

As it stands, the quantities in these stockpiles are estimated to be able to supply European markets amply for another year. We lack information as to whether the US forces have been able to find those drug caches. But even before the Taliban began to be routed in the military campaign, reports were coming in to the UN drug program that poppy fields were being prepared for planting in the Taliban-controlled Kandahar province and planting had begun in the Nangarhar area. And since much of the country has come under the control of the Northern Alliance, which had done nothing to restrict opium production, the potential for continued production and export of opium out of Afghanistan may still be considerable, even though it is not uncontrollable.

Two drug trade routes to Western Europe have been principally used. The first goes through Tajikistan to Russia, the Baltics, Eastern Europe and then Scandinavia and Germany. The other flows through Turkmenistan across the Caspian to the Caucasus and Turkey through the Balkans and Albania.

All the Central Asian 'frontline' governments appear to be seriously committed to combating the drug trade from Afghanistan because of its implications for their societies and security, at least at the top levels of their security forces and anti-drug agencies. Uzbekistan is much better able to implement this commitment than the other two countries because of their weaker governments, and so the UN Drug Control Program has spent millions of dollars to supply new equipment and other support to border guards particularly in Tajikistan. The transit of opium is still possible, however, because of the difficulty of patrolling the borders between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries, especially the longest and least guarded ones of Turkmenistan and the much more mountainous Tajikistan border.

Of course, another major factor promoting this traffic is the lucrative collusion of transporters, customs functionaries, and corrupt local officials. Along the Tajik border, Russian border guards are deployed along with Tajik border guards, Russian troops and Tajik Security Ministry troops. These forces have been interdicting the sometimes heavily armed drug convoys at considerable risk, with deadly shoot-outs being frequent. Although the hauls have increased in volume in recent years, some of the Russians as well as local Tajik and Kyrgyz officials, including diplomats, are suspected of accepting bribes to allow the shipments to go through. In recent months, Afghan drug merchants have been able to cross into Tajikistan and force local residents to sell drugs for them in the capital, Dushanbe. They can exert pressure on the people they recruit by threatening to harm their families. Four main road and foot routes are followed in the east and the west of Tajikistan to southern and then northern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. There, the drugs are loaded onto trains and trucks that take them to Russia, where Russian organized crime networks handle the rest of the trip to European traders and buyers.

Each participant in the trade along the way gets a commission or exacts a tax. The long route of the trade still makes it worthwhile to the participants, however, because the price rises as the product gets closer to Western Europe.. Afghan farmers receive a miniscule portion of the eventual total proceeds that result from the sales on the streets of European capitals. Whereas a kilogram of heroin is $41 to $50 a kilogram for the farmer, it may cost as much as $10,000 a kilogram in London.

Yet this elaborate intercontinental illegal industry could go into severe recession if its raw material was no longer produced at its primary source. The future of the drug industry in Afghanistan and its role as a fuel for insurgency movements will be decided to a significant degree by the approach that is taken by the US, the UN, and other key actors who are now shaping Afghanistan's politics and policies.

APPENDIX C - A POLICY ADVISORY STEERING COMMITTEE
for USAID's Conflict Prevention Program

This Steering Committee is designed to provide executive counsel. It could be composed of approximately seven to nine members with day-to-day familiarity with the situation on the ground in the Ferghana Valley or other areas of interest. An explicit objective for the Steering Committee would be to draw out the implications of a framework for conflict/peace capacities analysis, once a suitable framework has been developed. It could also help to link the macro political and micro project perspectives into useful operational guidance for dealing with conflict issues in particular places. It should seek to determine who should work where, who should do what, for how long, and why.

In particular, this Steering Committee could:

- Be composed of a variety of groups, including some that work and think at the macro-political level (such as OSCE, and ICG) and some that work and think at the grass roots level, (such as Mercy Corps.)
- Be convened and chaired by USAID, for USAID's own organizational purposes.
- Provide operational guidance to Mercy Corps and other stakeholders and partners.
- Meet approximately once a month.
- Rotate the venue of its meetings. If it meets Osh one month, then the next time it should meet in Andijon, followed by a meeting in Tajikistan.

Membership should be by invitation to specific known individuals.[22] The Steering Committee should not be captured or dominated by the interests of any single country, or any individual Mission. It is not a Donor's Coordination Committee (although some donors should attend.[23]) It is not a Partner's Committee, (although some partners will attend.) The flow of information and guidance should go from the Steering Committee (as advice) to the AID (PSC) staff person who will oversee this part of USAID's programs. This person, in turn should provide direction to Mercy Corps as well as to other USAID partners as appropriate.

Figure C-1:

A Possible Coordination Mechanism

for USAID's Conflict Prevention Program



APPENDIX D:

A Program Approach to Manage Political Change



APPENDIX E:

Key Ingredients in Effective Macro-Preventive Action[4]

Some case-study findings suggest that serious intra-state political tensions and issues at the country-level will tend to be addressed peacefully, rather than escalate into violence, to the extent that the following ingredients are present during the period of incipient tensions:[5]

When are actions taken?

1. Timely, *early* international and domestic action is taken as tensions emerge, but before, rather than following, significant use of violence, or immediately after any initial outbreaks.

   - Baltic states, Macedonia

2. This preventive engagement prioritizes the *short term* goals of preventing violence (i.e., security, basic stability, "peace") and managing immediate disputes that are surfacing – i.e., "direct" prevention -- in relation to the *longer term* goals of addressing underlying problems in institutions and society (e.g., political and social justice) – i.e., "structural" prevention -- in contextually-appropriate mixes and sequences.

   Generally, behavior and actions that immediately threaten major loss of life and destruction need to be deterred or stopped before more fundamental structures of power and socio-economic advantage are addressed. But short-term crisis management should be used to "buy time" for follow-up actions that tackle the more fundamental issues in credible ways.

What kinds of actions are taken?

3. Early action is *robust*, rather than half-hearted and equivocal, in the sense that it exerts vigorous positive and negative influences specifically on those leaders and political elites and their mobilized rank and file members of their constituencies, who are the major parties that might potentially engage in further confrontation. The aim is to persuade them to take a peaceful path.

4. Early action brings to bear on the situation, not simply one or two initiatives, such as a special

[4] Excerpted from "Observations Presented at the UN/OSCE Bishkek International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia: Strengthening Comprehensive Efforts to Counter Terrorism, Bishkek, Krygyzstan, 13-14 December 2001.

[5] This synthesis draws from, among others, Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Gabriel Munuera, Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lesson from Recent Experience (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, June, 1994); SusanWoodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1995; Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflict (U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996); Peter Wallensteen, ed. Preventing Violent Conflict: Past Record and Future Challenges (Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998); Lund, Rubin and Hara, "Learning from Burundi's Failed Democratic Transition, 1993-96: Did International Initiatives Match the Problem?" in Barnett Rubin, ed. Cases and Strategies of Preventive Action (Century Foundation Press, 1998); Vayrinen, et. al., Inventive and Preventive Diplomacy, (Notre Dame, Indiana: Joan Kroc Institute, University of Note Dame, 1999); Lund, " 'Preventive Diplomacy' for Macedonia, 1992-1997: Containment becomes Nation-Building," and other chapters in Bruce Jentleson, ed. Preventive Diplomacy in the Post Cold War World: Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized and Lessons to Be Learned (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); Lund, "Why Are Some Ethnic Disputes Settled Peacefully, While Others Become Violent? Comparing Slovakia, Macedonia, and Kosovo," in Hayward Alker, et. al. Eds. Journeys through Conflict (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).

envoy, but an appropriate *mixture* of policy influences. These may include "carrots," (conditional or unconditioned aid), "sticks," facilitative "tables" (venues for dialogue or negotiation), deterrents, and other forms of leverage. Such combinations make it possible to address the multiple short-term as well as long term factors that are driving the potential conflicts -- the several different political, social and economic levels or "fronts" on which conflicts are being played out.

As seen in the Appendix, the "conflict prevention toolbox" includes a variety of techniques and policy interventions, cutting across the sectors of diplomacy, development, military affairs, and civil society. Some of these instruments are being described in our sessions such as special envoys, international conventions, and legislative advice.

5. Early action does not solely promote the cause of the *weaker parties* in the conflict but also addresses the interests, fears and insecurities of the currently dominant, but possibly threatened, *stronger parties*. Where regimes are in possible transition toward gradually more open policies, it does not take the side exclusively of an anti-state political opposition.

   Work "across the lines" is needed to avoid backlash from a powerful but ultimately vulnerable *ancien regime*. Such an approach looks for opportunities for quiet "constructive engagement" with existing regime leaders and their cliques and keeps lines out and open to moderates or other persuadable elites to exercise transformation from within. It does not prematurely demonize potential tyrants by treating them as pariahs, thus giving them no recourse for shifting their loyalties to join the forces of change, but points out the "handwriting on the wall" and conjures up historic roles for elites as potential national invigorators.
   This avoids a sentimental or expressive moralistic approach that engages in Manichean "good guys" versus "bad guys" campaigns in favor of a pragmatic, "smart" approach that probes various leaders' and groups' specific political and economic incentives. Especially where the prevailing balance of power risks violent backlash, it creates opportunities for amnesty or "soft landings" to avoid existing leaders from digging in their heels and striking back against the forces of change.

   - South Africa

6. Specific political and financial support is provided to the established governing *formal institutions* of the state, as long as they are moving toward incorporating the leaders of the main contending communities in power-sharing arrangements, in rough proportion at least to those communities' distribution in the population, and these institutions do not simply perpetuate an exclusionary government.

   Responsible autonomous or semi-autonomous organs within the state and within the security forces are assisted to provide public services professionally. This enables the state to increasingly become the main arena for a governing process in which give-and-take politicking over public policy and constitutional issues goes on, and public business is transacted for the benefit of the general population.

7. *Military protection* is provided to these roughly representative decision-making elites, where it is necessary to protect their security so they can carry out public business and "deliver the goods" to the general population, and thus legitimate the official governing institutions of the state. These ultimately need to undertake the brunt of governing responsibility.

   - UNPREDEP in Macedonia

8. Future opportunities for joining *regional security alliances and economic aid and trade cooperation* also create an overall climate of support for building legitimate, peaceful states. This conveys a message to current or alternative leaders and elites that offers specific attractive incentives with the promise that, if their national policies take steps toward achieving economic and political reforms, respect minorities, etc., they are likely retain power -- for they will gain the political support of interest groups and the electorate who will see the economic benefits from integration.

    - Slovakia, Macedonia

9. Outside formal government, a *broad-based "constituency for peace*" is built up over time that cuts across the society's main politicized identity groups, that is not solely interested in politics, is primarily interested in peaceful pursuits such as commerce, and that thus has a vested interest in political stability and social prosperity. This approach also avoids reinforcing or coddling ethnic minority movements that may tend to polarize national politics by boycotting a polity's elections and declining other opportunities to participate in and thus leaven mainstream political life. Over time, a politically active but independent and cross-cutting civil society is built up that unifies major identity groups.

10. Peaceful "people power" campaigns are supported through training opposition leaders in specific non-violent techniques, such as peaceful demonstrations and general strikes, and non-incendiary conciliatory rhetoric, so that they can exert significant political pressure on incumbent leaders to take peaceful, responsible actions or retire from office, but don not provide ready excuses for cracking down on "threats to public order."

    - Zimbabwe

    These latter guideline avoid polarizing the political conflict to dangerous lengths by siding only with political oppositions in "we versus them" struggles and thus keeps international support from being a catalyst that provokes violent backlash, unless it is also prepared to protect the innocent victims of repression. In other words, the overall aim should not necessarily be an immediatre shift to democracy, human rights, economic reform, civil society, etc., at all costs, but rather *peaceful transition toward these values*.

Who takes action and how?

11. Preventive engagements are implemented by a sufficient number and kind of governmental and non-governmental actors, so as to provide the range of needed instruments (mediation, deterrence, institution-building, etc.) and resources to address the several leading drivers of the conflict. Rarely can any single actor or action prevent serious violent intra-state conflicts.

    Consequently, these multiple actors form a "critical mass" that visibly symbolizes a significant and compelling international and domestic commitment to non-violent change.

12. The engagement is supported politically and in other ways, or at least tolerated and not blocked or undermined by:
    - major *regional* powers
    - major *world* powers.

13. The engagement is generally viewed as legitimate by its being carried out under the aegis of the UN, OSCE, EU, or other regional multilateral organizations involving the states affected.

How are actions implemented?

14. The early multi-faceted action need not be "coordinated" among the major external actors, but it needs to be somewhat concerted and relatively consistent, rather than scattered or even contradictory.

Where are favorable regional, national, and local contexts?

15. Past relations between the politically significant groups have been peaceful in the *recent past*, rather than violent.

16. *Moderate leaders* from each of the contending communities are already in positions of authority and are in regular contact as they carry out the public's business, and they show some progress in carrying out public policies that benefit all communities.

17. *Economic reforms* have begun to disaggregate the assets of the state so that contending leaders and elites do not use them for rent-seeking as a source of enrichment or as patronage in the political competition for popular influence.

18. *Neighboring states* and near-border refugee communities adjacent or close to the immediate arena of conflict are neutral to an emerging conflict or actively promote its peaceful resolution, rather than supporting one side or another politically or militarily.

19. The *diasporas* of the parties to a conflict that reside in major third party countries support peaceful means of resolution, or at least are not highly mobilized behind their respective countrymen's cause. Thus, they do not aid and abet coercive or violent ways to pursue the conflict and lobby their host governments to take a partisan stance toward the conflict.

Conclusion

Not all these conditions may be required, but several are likely to be, depending on the existing degree of polarization. Thus, these findings may help international and domestic policymakers such as those in Central Asia, when they face situations where relationships between various actors, including governments, ethnic communities, opposition movements, and other actors, are increasingly tense, but where the non-violent resolution of differences still could have "positive sum" payoffs for everyone involved. Used as a "checklist" to see which of the key elements that may be needed to head off violence are in place, or not, they can provide guidelines for preventing violent conflicts from breaking out or from escalating to all-out wars.

ENDNOTES

[1] "Prevention" is used here rather than "mitigation" because the latter is ambiguous as to whether it means: a) that conflict (meaning violent conflict) has already arisen and needs to be contained or limited; or b) that any level of conflict (violent or non-violent) is to be reduced to some limited degree. The latter is not necessarily even desirable, and neither connotation explicitly refers to the avoidance of the eruption of violent conflict in the first place. USAID's aim in Central Asia appears to include a) where violence has arisen, but more importantly, the avoidance of violent conflict erupting in the first place.

[2] As a result, the emerging field of conflict prevention, as distinguished from the long-established field of conflict resolution. A cottage industry now exists of early warning frameworks, databases and conflict models. The meaning and types of policy instruments usable in conflict prevention have been elaborated. Lessons have been gathered from case study research about where conflict prevention has worked and not worked, and why, both at the micro (project) and macro (national) levels. Many donors have set up conflict units and are discussing how to "mainstream" conflict prevention goals and peace and conflict impact criteria into the normal procedures and projects of their agencies. Individual analysts and new organizations such as the Center for Preventive Action, the Forum for Early Warning and Response (FEWER), and the International Crisis Group (ICG) have published assessments of the potential for conflict in specific countries and regions. For more on the state-of-the-art in conflict prevention, see Lund, "From Lessons to Action," in Fen Hampson and David Malone, eds. *From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming in 2001).

[3] These commercial trends in the FV cities deserve rigorous study using precise measurements, for different short-term observers can come to rather different conclusions. Martha Brill Olcott concluded from a recent visit that there is significantly less commerce going on in the FV than in past years, based on an impression of fewer, less sophisticated in expensive goods in the stalls.

[4] Alisher Ilkhamov, "Impoverishment of the Masses in the Transition Period: Signs of an Emerging New Poor Identity in Uzbekistan," *Central Asian Survey* (2001), 20(1), p. 52.

[5] Ibid, pp. 47-8.

[6] A more elaborate but still preliminary effort to develop and apply a range of peace and conflict impact criteria to gauge the effectiveness of four types of NGO projects in Africa is found in Michael Lund, et. al. "The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Reducing Violent Conflicts and Building Peace," (Management Systems International, Inc., 2000). See *http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report/index.html.*

[7] In looking at this question, there is no implication that USAID or any other single donor should expect to address *all* the conflict/peace factors identified. This is unrealistic and would ignore the fact that conflict prevention is not the only goal of USAID's programs. "Matching" the results of the conflict diagnosis with the goals of existing programs is useful simply to pinpoint which problem areas are being addressed and which are not, but does not in itself prescribe any such courses of action. Whether more of these problems should or should not be addressed, or can or cannot be addressed, is a separate policy consideration that has to be based on mandates, resources, overall strategy, organizational capacity, political feasibility and other factors.

[8] We cannot know exactly how much impact is being realized in relation to the total scale of these sources/capacities, because such measurements are difficult to devise and apply.

[9] The causal relations of programs and projects to problems can be very complex, so the conclusions that emerge from a simple matching exercise should be treated as suggestive of the existing emphases, but not used as clear evidence of the presence or absence of impacts.

[10] Tony Vaux and Jonathan Goodhand, "Disturbing Connections: Aid and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan," INTRAC Conflict Report, 2000.

[11] PA Consulting, Mercy Corps, and Chemonics all work with different but potentially related aspects of water, for example.

[12] For example: health reforms, housing privatization, or water efficiency.

[13] USAID should not confuse its support for the development of independent journalism with its efforts to promote the substantive content of its partner's programs. The idea of independent journalism is still new for Central Asia, and journalists often take materials that others have prepared for them, and run it as if it were news. If AID wants to promote the substance of its partner's programs more fully, it might do some of this through the direct purchase of airtime, so it does not confuse objectives that together contribute to the development of a sustainable civil society.

[14] The film "Before the Rain" that was produced in Macedonia in the early 1990's had a significant impact in stirring public consciousness of the possible consequences if a Bosnia-like war were to break out in their country.

[15] The partners and InterNews, by themselves are not currently equipped to fully address the needs for an expanded media program, that publicizes partners activities, as well as the work that various host country governments and other donors may be doing. The mission of Internews is primarily to develop the role of journalism in Central Asia. By their mandate and corporate culture, they are not a public relations firm. With their existing resources they are not equipped to carry out extensive public education campaigns. In a somewhat similar manner, individual partners are expected to carry out their primary tasks as determined by their contracts or cooperative agreements. Normally they are not mandated to take on the broader and somewhat unique public education role we are suggesting in this cluster of recommendations.

[16] While some of the international expertise in editing and packaging materials would probably need to come from the United States, some of it could also come from the Ukraine, Russia, or Central Europe, which have good media production capabilities. The programming should be prepared through close collaboration with local cultural and other specialists so that it responds to local sentiments and popular tastes.

[17] USAID has supported the development of systems and methodologies for capturing the energy of such coalitions, under the framework of a program called 'Implementing Policy Change.' This approach was initially designed to effect changes of specific policies. It has begun to be broadened to effect broader social changes, of the sort that will be required across Central Asia over the next decade.

[18] Of course interests groups won't all have an interest in mitigating conflict. However, most people living in the states of the Former Soviet Union have been denied legitimate avenues of association for seven decades or longer. People are still learning how to re-establish civil life, and how to build and manage civic associations. Individual interest groups need to be encouraged in this process, as USAID is doing in its work with NGOs. Other interest groups in CAR besides the NGO community also merit explicit support.

[19] See, for example, Charles Fairbanks, et. al., *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia* (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States and Central Asia-Caucasus Institute), prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[20] The applicability of the CSCE process and OSCE mechanisms in Asian contexts is being explored by a track-two activity undertaken by East Asian regional NGO's under the auspices of the Asian Regional Forum of ASEAN.

[21] Opium production is by no means inevitable in developing countries. It has been virtually eliminated, whenever decisive government measures were taken to suppress it. This was done recently in Lebanon, Guatemala, and Egypt, and India and China did so earlier.

[22] Organizations as such should not be granted chairs on the committee. Rather, specific individuals with real on-the-ground familiarity concerning the situation should be invited to sit on the Committee. As a practical matter, membership will probably prove to be somewhat ad hoc, depending on the specific issues that need to be discussed, as well as the venue of a particular meeting.

[23] Both the Swiss development assistance program and DFID might prove useful, either as direct members, or with 'observer status,' depending upon diplomatic requirements.